To

My wife, Madeline ("Through all our earthly seasons true")
and children, Eleanor and Daniel
charges and sells information of dubious reliability in exchange for prosecutive laxity. A dealer in contraband who sells information to the ATF told me in an interview a few years ago: “If I’m really broke, I can always sell a piece of information to the ATF. The dope [information] I offer them is true—but sometimes exaggerated. I figure they already have a lead on the person. My agent sometimes asks about a case he’s working on; he wants some information, in fact, he gets very palsy. They have got a stake in me; if I’m busted, I can count on them for help.”

Freelance informers also are accorded a welcome reception by ATF. In 1971, Larry Shears, then an unemployed laborer and a former spy for the Kern County (California) sheriff’s office, entered into an agreement with the ATF for a $10,000 fee in return for information about a plot to assassinate Cesar Chavez. The fee, approved in Washington, included payment for services as an informer and later as witness as well as the cost of relocation after surfaced. The reward was never paid because the alleged plotters were arrested on unrelated charges. Shears received only $500 in payment according to a voucher “for information and evidence necessary to identify those persons who are providing . . . the funds to arrange the arson and murder of Cesar Chavez.”

The most important function of the ATF informer is, however, the sale not of information but of hard evidence, usable in a courtroom. ATF informers may set up, as well as participate in, a “buy.” But whether the informer or only his agent becomes involved, the use of such evidence is frequently protested on grounds of entrapment and provocation. The uncrowned king of ATF informers is surely Roy E. Frankhouser, former Pennsylvania Grand Dragon of the United Klans of America, organizer of the National States Rights Party, a Minuteman activist, and a member of more than thirty other right-wing groups.

Frankhouser reveled in spookery and claimed that he was in fact a double agent, using his role as ATF informer to obtain access to intelligence in the agency’s files about his right-wing associates. He even boasted that he had taped telephone conversations between an ATF control and a Minuteman informant who was also a double agent, and that he had obtained recordings through his own intelligence network of conversations of Attorney General John Mitchell and his successor Richard Kleindienst. Frankhouser tried to penetrate the left with a cover story that he belonged to a “populist” segment of the rightist movement that shared the libertarianism of the radicals. But he kept mum about his ATF connections. After the publication of the CIA FBI files in WIN magazine, a liberal publication, Frankhouser invited the editors to his Reading, Pennsylvania, headquarters, where he held forth on how he had master-minded counterintelligence tricks to foil the ATF’s infiltration of the far right. In September 1975 Frankhouser pleaded guilty to his involvement in the disposal of 139 pounds of dynamite, 245 blasting caps, and 10,000 feet of detonating cord stolen from a local mining company in May and July of 1973. The court rejected Frankhouser’s sole defense that he was an agent of the government at the time.

The ATF, like all intelligence agencies, rejects responsibility for its informers on the ground that their lapses are unavoidable occupational hazards. But what can one say in justification of the recruitment of the would-be assassin of ex-President Gerald Ford, Sara Jane Moore? On the day before the attempted assassination, Moore, accompanied by an ATF special agent, visited a dealer in firearms for the purpose of setting up a gun buy. Although Moore was a castoff (she had informed for the FBI from June of 1974 until June of the following year, when her services were terminated), the ATF took her on for a gun-traffic clean-up jointly conducted with the San Francisco Police Department. By the summer of 1975, not only was her identity established but it had become obvious that her reliability was, to say the least, quite dubious. Her disturbed mental state, which ultimately triggered the assassination attempt, was quite apparent from her wild talk. As a Bay Area radical put it, “Everybody but the feds knew she was flakey. Even the feds may have known but they didn’t seem to mind.”

A similarly unstable but less melodramatic type is Eustacio (“Frank”) Martinez, who for two-and-a-half years served as informant and provocateur for the ATF. A former mental patient in a Texas veterans hospital, Martinez was recruited in August 1969 after his conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun he said he had acquired in a gangfight. Offered a choice between serving as an ATF spy or a jail term, he signed on. After the fear of jail, Martinez wanted desperately to be an “American first, Chicano second.” Between September 1969 and October 1970 Martinez carried out three major assignments: the infiltration of the Mexican-American Youth Organization (MAYO) and the Brown Beret Organization in Houston and Kingsville, Texas; the development of intelligence data on these groups, their leaders, and supporters; and the provocative instigation of violence both to preserve his cover as a “militant Chicano leader” and to set up these targets for arrest. Martinez himself took part in numerous acts of disruption and violence. When he became “hot” in October 1970, he was transferred to Los Angeles to infiltrate the national office of the Brown Berets and the National Moratorium Committee. Under the code name “Adam 26,” he also informed for the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).

In the quickly assumed role of militant leader, Martinez acquired access to letters, files, and names, which he turned over to the ATF and the police. Soon after arriving in southern California, he led a violent disruption of a speech by Senator John Tunney. Martinez literally went out of control: he attempted to knock in the top of a car driven by one of Tunney’s aides, kicked Tunney, and beat his assistant. Martinez later recalled: “Several days later I reported my role in the incident to one of my superiors, Tito Garcia. Garcia’s response was that I was to provoke incidents, but I should not go to the extreme of ‘kicking a politician in the ass.’ I also reported my role in this incident to Agent Fernando Ramos and Supervisor Jim Riggs at a later occasion.” Martinez was not playing. One organizer in the Mexican-American community stated that “Frank was a time-bomb. They [ATF and LAPD] knew this, and counted on it. In a tense situation where Frank would be pitted against some important authority figure, he’d explode.”

As Martinez’s reputation grew, his controls instructed him, as he put it, to “start hassles among the people to divide them, create incidents and do crazy things to gain a reputation as a Chicano militant.” In November 1970 Martinez paraded in front of the Chicano Moratorium office with a .40 caliber shotgun, with the goal of provoking a police raid. The raid took place later that day, and
resulted in numerous injuries, arrests, and convictions. After a Moratorium rally on January 31, 1971, Martinez asserts that he helped provoke a riot by “shouting and throwing things at the East Los Angeles Sheriff Station and talking about doing in police and throwing a reporter in the river.” A short time later many Chicanos were hurling rocks, and soon sheriff’s deputies arrived with loaded shotguns, not tear gas. The Moratorium swiftly folded. When Martinez’s compatriots began to suspect him, he became anxious and tried to withdraw completely. Unresolved complaints of underpayment hastened his return to Texas in April 1971.

In the summer of that year Martinez was brought back to California to help destroy an organization, La Casa de Carnalissimo, suspected by the ATF and the LAPD of serving as a cover for the Chicano Liberation Front, the group credited with a series of bombings in East Los Angeles. His ATF and LAPD sponsors furnished him with membership lists and photographs of leading militants and urged him to engage in bombings as a member of La Casa; the needed explosives would be supplied. When Martinez returned negative reports about planned violence and disassociated the Casa from the Chicano Liberation Front, he was told that his information “was a bunch of bullshit” and that “we are going to close that organization down by any means necessary.” His disenchantment mounted when he was asked to plant a drug addict and pusher in La Casa. Soon afterward Martinez resigned and publicly recanted. He said: “I came forward for the simple reason that I was beginning to realize that our people were being railroaded.” Other sources say that Martinez balked at any future assignment when the ATF reneged on an earlier promise of immunity from a prosecution arising out of an arrest on August 29, 1971, for inciting a riot and interfering with an officer in East Los Angeles. His ATF control, apparently fearful of Martinez’s turn-about, had urged him to plead guilty with the intention of forcing his return to Texas. Martinez’s search for identity as an American ended in a devastating isolation. In an interview in 1972 he said: “I cannot join any organization, because, for fear I might be found out—who I was in the past—it has damaged me psychologically. I cannot go to any group gatherings, rallies or anything, because no one will trust me.”

The Nixon Administration’s IRS Takeover Attempts

The Nixon administration viewed the IRS as a Roman general might have viewed the legions he was preparing to turn loose on a province ripe for conquest. “What we cannot do in a courtroom via criminal prosecution,” Huston explained, “the IRS could do by administrative action. Moreover, valuable intelligence-type information could be turned up by IRS as a result of their field audits.” The administration’s demands on the IRS were unique for another reason: it was not merely that the White House wanted to use the agency to attack a particular class of taxpayers—such as leftist and liberal tax-exempt organizations; it also pinpointed the targets with the highest priority. Its exorbitant demands on the IRS were doomed to failure. The IRS response was too slow, cautious, and, in some instances, quite uncooperative. When, in the fall of 1970, the administration received a progress report from IRS Commissioner Randolph Thrower on the SSS, a bitterly disappointed Tom Huston transmitted it to Haldeman with the observation that it “is long on words and short on action.” Top White House political strategist Patrick Buchanan wrote that what was needed was a shake-up in the IRS bureaucracy, and, “an especially friendly fellow, with a friendly staff in the Tax Exempt office.”

After Huston had followed up with a reminder of the President’s continuing interest, the IRS moved on an important front: Commissioner Thrower announced that, “pending further study,” the Service would discontinue granting tax-exempt status to public interest law firms. A natural outgrowth of the consumer movement of the sixties, the public interest firms were emerging as watchdogs of neglected areas of national concern. The firms’ principal benefactors were the tax-exempt foundations, led by the Ford Foundation, an administration bête noire. The IRS warned Ford and all other donors to the public interest law firm movement not to make long-term commitments to the firms pending completion of the study, on pain of losing their own exemptions. The move seemed mystifying: the firms were nonprofit entities and engaged neither in lobbying for legislation nor propaganda. In the wake of a storm of protest against the freeze by congressional leaders, including House Minority Leader Gerald Ford and two members of the Nixon administration (Russell Train and Virginia Knauer, environmental and consumer affairs functionaries, respectively), the IRS reversed itself.

But there was one casualty of the administration’s pressure. In September 1970, at about the same time that Huston complained about Thrower to Haldeman, a public interest firm, the Center on Corporate Responsibility, a Ralph Nader group, requested tax exemption which IRS ultimately denied after a two-and-a-half-year delay. In a suit filed in 1973, the Center alleged an unlawful denial of tax-exempt status and discriminatory treatment for political and ideological reasons without basis in the statute and the IRS regulations. A United States District Court on December 11, 1973, ruled that the tax exemption had improperly been denied under circumstances raising an unmistakable inference of political intervention. The court took note of the long delay and the fact that the Interpretive Division of the IRS Chief Counsel’s office had unanimously approved the application. The opinion denying exemption had been written under Barth’s direction, and a note in the file by the Interpretive Division’s Assistant Director read: “Perhaps White House pressure.”

The White House also plundered established procedures developed in the past to give the chief executive access to IRS data in order to develop legislative programs and (the “sensitive case” procedure) to prevent abuses in cases involving political figures. Because the tax files sought by the administration were to be used for illegitimate purposes, these procedures, which required formal requests, were bypassed in favor of private channels developed through the administration’s IRS contacts. Thus, the White House intervened to defuse and sabotage an IRS investigation of Charles (“Bebe”) Rebozo’s tax returns, while at the same time Ehrlichman ordered a speed-up of a pre-election audit of
suspected by military intelligence officers as a secret repository of legal defense
files. (In the course of this break-in an armed robbery was committed in which
about $1000 in cash and four watches were stolen.) Red squad members checked
in advance whether the church had a burglar alarm system and reported
their findings to the Legion's break-in team.

Both the Army and the red squad played a role in Legion gas-bomb attacks
that disrupted the performances of Russian ballet and Chinese acrobatic troupes
in 1970 and 1971. Army intelligence agents furnished the grenades to the Chicago
unit which, in turn, passed to the Legion through an intermediary, a right-
wing businessman. The Legion's style became increasingly bold as its ties with
the police and military units strengthened. An effort by a Chicago civic group,
the Independent Voters of Illinois (IVI), to induce a state law enforcement
official to investigate was leaked by police officers to Sutton, who constantly
bragged to his victims and critics of his friends in high places.

The linkages between the intelligence community and the private sector are
best illustrated by the John Birch Society (JBS). The brightest jewel in the
right-wing intelligence diadem was, in the late sixties and early seventies, one
David Emerson Gumaer, who claimed to be, and was billed in the John Birch
Society lecture publicity as, an "undercover operative for the Intelligence Divi-
sion of a major metropolitan police department" who had "successfully infil-
trated the SDS, the DuBois Clubs and the National Conference for a New
Politics" and "rose to key positions inside the New Left."* Gumaer presented
his readers and lecture audiences with claimed disclosures drawn "from intel-
ligence files," and labeled an "intelligence report" the fruits of his consultation
with "intelligence sources" presumably eager to share their secrets with him
because of his own background. One such report is "California, Pilot Project
for Red Revolution," which appeared in the July 1969 issue of Review of the
News, a Birch-sponsored newsletter. The chilling thesis of this article is that a
revolution was then in progress, "which aims for complete victory" in 1972. The
tone is super-spookish: at "a recent intelligence meeting . . . this reporter was
told that intelligence personnel in the Bay Area have affirmed detailed evidence
of Communist subsidies to radical groups"; "in a highly confidential Intelligence
Summary issued last August fifteenth by the Office of Military Intelligence for
the State of California"; "during an interview with several intelligence officials
at the Alameda County Courthouse, I discovered . . ."; "discussing Commu-
nists' activity in the Oakland area with police intelligence officers, your reporter
was shown a document . . ." and so on. Like Rees, Gumaer turned up on the
staff of a congressional Bircher, Representative John Schmitz.

A major JBS intelligence exposé in recent years develops the thesis that the
attempted assassination of Governor George Wallace on May 15, 1972, was the
result of a Communist plot, deliberately covered up by the federal govern-
ment.

*Advertisement in the Santa Ana Register, Nov. 6, 1970; American Opinion (September 1969),
p. 57. The "major metropolitan police department" is the Chicago Police Department, which
initially denied that Gumaer was ever employed by it in any capacity. However, subsequent
admissions, confirmed by documents, establish that Gumaer, using the alias David LeMarc; spied
for the Chicago red squad from October 1965 until September 1967. The "key positions" claim is
a bit of puffery.
their political adversaries. In 1973, the NCLC entered the political process through the U.S. Labor Party (USLP), now its major enterprise and institutional alter ego.

The NCLC derives its program and style from its enemies: a vast byzantine conspiracy dominated by the Rockefeller family. Ironically, large segments of the right—not merely its crazies—also place Rockefeller power at the center of an international subversive conspiracy. But hostility of this kind is largely explained by the hatred of the political zealot for the betrayer-heretic, frequently in an assortment of institutions and social movements. Convinced of his destined greatness, he proclaimed his wedding day in 1978 an international workers' holiday. A veteran of World War II military intelligence, LaRouche has made a fetish of "intelligence" as an NCLC priority in foiling the never-ending machinations of the conspiracy to frustrate his deserved ascent to power.* As with the Minutemen, the SAO, the Posse Comitatus, and similar groups, intelligence is not a casual or optional activity but is a trademark of the NCLC, as well as of its offshoots and fronts such as the USLP, the International Caucus of Labor Committees, the Labor Organizers' Defense Fund, and the Revolutionary Youth Movement. A special intelligence staff functions to monitor and deceive the enemy, complemented by an elite security unit to foil attempts to undermine the solidarity of the membership. Its New York office bespeaks, in the words of a Wall Street Journal reporter, "the tight security and the serious mood [of] some sensitive government intelligence post." Its numerous publications include two with an intelligence focus, Counterintelligence and Executive Intelligence Review, a weekly journal.

To prepare for aggressive actions, NCLC organizers are routinely instructed to submit intelligence reports on rivals and opponents. Deception, the use of false names, the formation of bogus groups with the acronymic tags of already existing organizations, phone calls from impersonators, post office boxes disguised as offices, infiltration, counterfeiting, the reporting on non-events, and the deliberate bloating of its numerical following—these are all integral to the NCLC mode, as is the projection phenomenon, common to many groups that play intelligence games, by which critics and opponents are almost instinctively denounced as spies.

A prime weapon in the NCLC's intelligence arsenal has been direct violent action against its adversaries on the left. For this purpose, it has maintained a squad of thirty to forty members, as well as a school in an upstate New York farmhouse that conducts classes in the martial arts, weapons systems, explosives handling, and demolition tactics. To clear the way for LaRouche's ascent to the revolutionary summit by wiping out more successful rivals, the NCLC in 1973 organized Operation Mop Up, which mounted some sixty armed attacks in a number of cities on activities of the Communist Party, its youth affiliate, and

the Socialist Workers' Party. Organized gangs of NCLC'ers with clubs, pipes, and nunchucks (a karate weapon consisting of two chain-linked cudgels) inflicted scores of injuries on their hapless victims, some of whom required hospitalization. Planned disruptions of meetings, physical threats, and ruthless take-over raids became stock practices.

Collaboration by NCLC with official intelligence structures began in 1974, when field workers were instructed to brief local police on the activities of political enemies. Since then the NCLC has admitted acting as an informer for both urban and state intelligence units. In 1976, after renouncing its former professed lefism in favor of an authoritarian conservatism, it developed a special intelligence mission to monitor and analyze "terrorist" groups. (In LaRouche's lexicon, "terrorist" is simply an epithet used to characterize virtually the entire left-liberal spectrum, a means of mobilizing official intelligence resources against USLP rivals and enemies.) It was the NCLC's intelligence briefing of Philadelphia Mayor Frank Rizzo, predicting a terrorist disruption of the Bicentennial celebration, that led to his request for federal troops. Despite the inaccuracy of its briefing, the NCLC, in a subsequent ten-page "Open letter to Philadelphia Police," nevertheless claimed credit for the peaceful character of the demonstrations because "after the Labor Party informed Mayor Rizzo [of the alleged planned violence], the Mayor acted to defuse the situation by focusing national attention on that danger."

The extent of NCLC's collaboration with police structures is suggested by its role as an intelligence arm of the New Hampshire state police in the April 30, 1977, demonstration by the Clamshell Alliance against a proposed nuclear power plant at Seabrook, New Hampshire. On April 1, 1977, NCLC's New England representative telephoned the New Hampshire governor's office to warn of the subversive danger of the ecology movement generally and of the planned Seabrook demonstration in particular. To buttress its proposal for further action to check the nuclear power opposition, the NCLC suggested to the governor's press office:

We do have a full brief of the environmentalist movement and where every group is funded from, and we have another brief which we drew up for the Bicentennial Movement, which we could send you both of them [sic] and you could cross-grid them and we could discuss exactly how to have a Congressional investigation—that is the idea."

Subsequent disclosures from the New Hampshire state police files revealed a number of communications and meetings between Lieutenant Donald Buxton and NCLC activists, as well as NCLC briefing documents, including a copy of Information Digest* dealing with Clamshell Alliance. Buxton's intelligence report states that "these well-informed gentlemen" viewed the demonstration as "nothing but a cover for terrorist activity."

NCLC has also collaborated with federal agencies. Initial denunciation of Bureau surveillance (as a tactic of the Rockefeller conspiracy) has given way in the NCLC's counterterrorist phase to a new amity. Released Bureau files show that the NCLC has instigated national security investigations of its political

* FBI documents speak of LaRouche in this way: "He reports that key aides were programmed for his assassination. His concept of his own destiny is grandiose. The fate of the world is riding on his shoulders."
targets and fed material into the agency's files designed to discredit them and assure continuing surveillance. In addition to written and telephone briefings on terrorism, usually followed by mailed presentations from its ever-expanding library of published and manuscript documents on intelligence themes, representatives from its executive hierarchy have visited Bureau offices for briefing conferences. In June 1976 one such meeting was held for the purpose of "furnishing information concerning Rockefeller and the Institute for Policy Studies plan of nuclear attack on Philadelphia during the People's Bicentennial celebration on July 4, 1976."

The bid for police and intelligence cooperation was subsequently broadened. In 1976 the NCLC dispatched a three-page letter to ten federal and state agencies, warning of a terrorist conspiracy to harass the group and to assassinate LaRouche, its candidate for President. Its 1976 publication, "Carter and the Party of International Terrorism," charges that a terrorist apparatus on the left and an array of government agencies, foundations, and research institutes in league with the Carter administration and the Rockefellers are plotting a world nuclear holocaust. The NCLC's policies and propaganda have won a measure of rightist favor and endorsement, since, as one conservative journal explained, "It is not supported by Rockefeller money, as are all similar groups." NCLC's personalized leadership style and ruthless power drive carry us into realms of cultist messianism in which the gratification of personal needs for submission to authority, for packaged dogmas, and for group reinforcement dissolves all unwelcome realities. The convert, aflame with the passion to preserve his new-found salvation at all costs, turns on challengers and critics with the savagery made familiar by holy wars.*

In the fall of 1977, in the wake of the U.S. Labor Party's intensive involvement in the previous year's elections, the Justice Department announced the termination of the Bureau's seven-year investigation of the NCLC and its Labor Party clone. But the group's journey from violence to respectability has not altered its intelligence-style targeting of dissidents through infiltration, deception, and disruption in order to ease the path to power. In the late seventies, it developed propaganda and intelligence programs directed against Jewish and anti-apartheid groups in this country, in courting racist domestic constituencies and, investigators charge, as bait for Arab and South African financial backing. Its continuing intelligence priorities are reflected in cadre training programs in counterintelligence, conducted at "The Farm" in Powder Springs, Georgia, by Mitchell Wer Bell III, a legendary private intelligence operative. Wer Bell is also LaRouche's personal security consultant, hired to protect him against the never-ending assassination conspiracies which he claims threaten him on all sides. The group's intelligence-gathering activities support the production through a variety of methods of a stream of profiles and evaluative reports, uniformly grooming LaRouche's ideological obsessions and used for both propaganda and a service to paying clients. According to one investigative reporter, Dennis King, its files "may well be the largest single collection of intelligence data in the United States." In promoting his 1980 presidential campaign, LaRouche has allied himself with the countersubversive drive to restore the CIA's intelligence powers. On February 27, 1979, he publicly appealed for support for a private intelligence agency to perform the functions "that ought to be the proper domain of the CIA."

What he proposed, LaRouche explained, "is a de facto augmentation of the resources of the U.S. Labor Party, thereby combining the core contribution to be made by the USLP with the resources otherwise beffiting a U.S. government intelligence service into an independent agency... endowed by corporate and other private sources. . . ."

California-style Spookery—Ducote and Company

Countersubversion dominates California politics in a special way. Its ruling elites—corporations, agribusinesses, banks, and the press—have since the twenties effectively exploited the fear of communism in curbing challenges to their power. The countersubversive constituency in the state is substantial and passionate, and it has influenced mainstream politics in a unique way: one need only recall Richard M. Nixon and his heir, Ronald Reagan. As countersubversion has entered the political process, its intelligence techniques have turned from passive data collection to more aggressive initiatives. And this California style—break-ins, deceptions, dirty tricks, and the like—is evident in the pattern of aggressive intelligence activities that culminated in the Watergate break-in.

History has supplied us with a dramatic rendering of this politicization of crime in the saga of Jerome Ducote. A deputy sheriff in Santa Clara County for ten years, a one-time member of the State Republican Central Committee, a leader of the Young Republicans, and county chairman of the John Birch Society, Ducote in 1976 admitted having committed seventeen burglaries of the Church. He was convicted in a twenty-one-count indictment. Ducote's control—to use the intelligence term—for most of his operations was R. Kenneth Wilhelm, secretary of the Santa Clara Farm Bureau. A super-conspiratorial type and a certified Communist loather, Wilhelm is the very model of the intelligence middleman who wos

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* L. Ron Hubbard's Church of Scientology, a religious therapy group that has frequently clashed with government agencies, is also high on aggressive intelligence, especially the security/counterintelligence version. Among the items seized by the FBI in two raids in 1977 were dossiers on the church's critics, lock-picking and bugging equipment, a blackjack, and a vial labeled "vampire's blood." An indictment filed by a Washington, D.C., grand jury in August 1978 charges eleven Scientologists with a conspiracy to infiltrate government offices, the planting of two underground agents in government jobs, bugging an IRS conference room, and pilfering files from the IRS and the Department of Justice. In January 1979, the prosecution charged the defendants with ordering the investigation of at least 14 members of the judiciary to insure that a friendly judge would be selected for the trial. In October, eight defendants were convicted of a conspiracy to steal government documents dealing with the Church and a ninth of stealing government records. Like the NCLC/USLP, the Scientologists have responded to critics and defectors with fierce hostility. Court-released files reveal a pattern of deception, infiltration, dirty tricks, disinformation projects, and related tactics designed to silence or harass its enemies—not only government agencies but individual targets as well. The files show, for example, that a member was placed in a job by a stenographer with a New York firm in order to obtain access to a pending grand jury investigation in a case involving the Church. "We have had some success (limited) in the past with getting this type of data," states a 1977 memo. A subsequent entry indicates that the mission was successful.
has been confirmed is that Segretti canvassed the San Diego area for infiltration and covert action resources to neutralize the proposed demonstration by the Convention Coalition.

Godfrey was protected by the Bureau to the end; he was not permitted to surface as a witness until the Bureau had obtained a promise from the local authorities to find him a new job in another area. For five years he had been allowed free rein to act out his ideological hostility and indulge his mania for intelligence hugger mugger. As he put it, he had had "fun."

Closing the Information Gap

The emergence in the sixties and early seventies of new areas of dissent and previously unidentified dissenters sharpened the demand for exposed material. How to establish the subversive character of such post-Vietnam domestic movements as environmental control, prison reform, and opposition to nuclear energy? The pressure for countersubversive ammunition was further intensified by foreign policy developments—over China, Cuba, Rhodesia, South Korea, and South Africa—and armaments struggles—the SALT talks, the IBM missile crisis, proposed arms reductions, and nuclear arms limitation.

Only in diehard fanatic circles could the Communist Party continue to serve as the exclusive negative reference group. The accumulated acres of files, tontastic tributes to the Menace, had to be updated without sacrificing the continuity of the countersubversive tradition. The times demanded a J. B. Matthews; indeed, a troop of them, to renew the energies of nativism in the waters of a new "communism" not identified with the Communist Party alone but equally capable of activating a modern countersubversive constituency.

The task of revising old norms interlocked with that of identification. The reindoctrinated constituency had to be led through the many mansions of a modernized Menace, then introduced to their occupants. One important response to the new challenge of evaluation and identification is the Information Digest, a biweekly newsletter published by a couple, John and S. Louise Rees (their real names; they have, as will be seen, also used pseudonyms). The Information Digest is full of reminders that it is a product of a collection network which includes infiltrators. One issue tells its readers that a reproduced list of radical movements, preserving the continuity between the old and new by treating gaps and discordances as themselves the result of deliberate deception by an overarching conspiracy.

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Only in diehard fanatic circles could the Communist Party continue to serve as the exclusive negative reference group. The accumulated acres of files, tontastic tributes to the Menace, had to be updated without sacrificing the continuity of the countersubversive tradition. The times demanded a J. B. Matthews; indeed, a troop of them, to renew the energies of nativism in the waters of a new "communism" not identified with the Communist Party alone but equally capable of activating a modern countersubversive constituency.

The task of revising old norms interlocked with that of identification. The reindoctrinated constituency had to be led through the many mansions of a modernized Menace, then introduced to their occupants. One important response to the new challenge of evaluation and identification is the Information Digest, a biweekly newsletter published by a couple, John and S. Louise Rees (their real names; they have, as will be seen, also used pseudonyms). The Information Digest is full of reminders that it is a product of a collection network which includes infiltrators. One issue tells its readers that a reproduced list of radical movements, preserving the continuity between the old and new by treating gaps and discordances as themselves the result of deliberate deception by an overarching conspiracy.

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The CCCRCL was headquartered in the Reeses’ home, a commune which they made a gathering place for local left groups and a pied à terre for out-of-towners, all of whose activities were duly recorded in ID. A locked room was subsequently discovered to have housed arms and wiretapping equipment, which however was not used for bugging the premises, although the D.C. police had in fact authorized Rees to install the equipment. Another location rented by the police intelligence unit and used by Rees as an office was bugged.

Rees ended his D.C. police connection in 1973, but both before and after that time he developed liaison relationships with right-wing and police sources for the clandestine dissemination of intelligence (his readers are repeatedly reminded that they can obtain additional information through previously established contacts) and data collection. A police informer for a number of Eastern urban intelligence units assisted Rees in producing the ID. In dealing with local police, Rees used a familiar scam: he would hawk information to one department (typically a lurid tale of a violent plot) and in the course of this transaction, pick up information that he would in turn peddle to a unit in another city. In the same way, he enlarged his network of sources for ID by inviting follow-up inquiries from police units, which in turn supplied him with file material. Within a short time Rees’s confidence scams, first developed in his infiltration apprenticeship, established his ID as unofficial broker for the exchange of countersubversive information among Eastern police departments. By citing his connections with other police departments, he induced D.C. police to pull him off the street.

Rees became a sort of Renaissance man of countersubversive intelligence, covering a wide spectrum of functions including an investigative stint for Wackenhut,* deceptions and impersonations so professional as to deceive both his sponsors and victims.†

In the early seventies he posed as a lawyer under the name John O’Connor,* although the Wackenhut agency’s records confirm that an individual with Rees’s name, address, and Social Security number was hired on two separate occasions. Wackenhut’s personnel department (after hearings held on Wackenhut’s investigative practices by the Privacy Protection Study Commission) denied that he had in fact been employed by the agency.†

The Chicago Police Department refused to buy one of his lurid items. Instead, it opened a file on him, characterizing him as a “confidence man type” who possesses all of the unreliable characteristics associated with such a person.”

Rees’s gleanings became the subject of an ID report inserted in the Congressional Record by Georgia Congressman Larry McDonald. In 1978 McDonald provided Rees with a special assignment: to supply research assistance to a group of Iranians encouraged to seek an injunction against student demonstrators protesting the visit to Washington of the Shah.

McDonald also provided a sanctuary for the other member of this odd couple, S. Louise Rees, who is fully as versatile as her husband. Like him, she spiced her editorial research and writing activities with operational deception. Using the name Sheila O’Connor, she first developed a cover as a participant in a prison project conducted by the Institute for Policy Studies. Next, she successfully infiltrated the D.C. chapter of the National Lawyers Guild (NLG), where for a year and a half she made herself indispensable through her efficiency and hard work and at the same time did her best to sabotage its activities. A registration list of attendees at the Guild convention in February 1973, including “Sheila O’Connor,” was reproduced in ID and disseminated four days after the convention ended. The list was also incorporated in a more extended expose of the NLG published by the CLA in 1976, “Lawyers for Trason.” Unaware of Ms. O’Connor’s ID connection—or for that matter that ID even existed—the local Guild officials defended her against the suspicions of a few (O’Connor herself denounced an accuser as “yobist”). In August 1973, two months after she had been elected to the Guild’s national executive board in recognition of her contributions, she disappeared. In January of the next year, reverting to her Louise Rees identity, she was taken on as an HISC research aide, and when HISC folded in 1975, she turned up on McDonald’s staff along with Herbert Romerstein. Ms. Rees works at her Baltimore home, where she uses the name “Seeley.” Her husband, when not responding to pretrial examination demands in three civil suits brought by his victims, promotes a news service for the countersubversive market, collecting information from concealed sources under the cover of a freelance journalist and correspondent for the John Birch Society’s Review of the News. He now denies that either he or his wife ever engaged in espionage or infiltration. “We were reporting. And we didn’t use aliases. We used pen names.” The FBI, however, could not permit itself such conceits. In responding to questions in a lawsuit, it stated: “Louise Rees served as an FBI informant from August 1973 to February 1976 and reported on domestic security matters. . . . Mr. Rees furnished information to the FBI on a voluntary basis from at least 1971 until 1974.” But it is time we took closer notice of the Georgia congressman and his operation in support of the private intelligence sector.
The Revival of the Documented Exposé

The post-Watergate revolt that produced the 94th Congress and closed down HISC's marathon countersubversive investigation also brought to Congress Laurence G. (now "Larry") McDonald, a physician and the youngest member of the national council of the John Birch Society. McDonald promptly converted the Congressional Record into an organ for disseminating countersubversive propaganda and dossiers, focusing on the new radicals and dissenters. From the time he began service in 1975 until the end of 1977, McDonald placed in the "Extension of Remarks" section of the Congressional Record over 1000 insertions, including some 220 detailed dossiers, expose-style identifications of individuals and organizations characterized as subversive. Whenever available, the insertion provides the addresses and even the telephone numbers of the subjects.

Sympathetic members of Congress have always used their legislative prerogative to serve nativist causes by publishing material in the Record in the form of floor speeches or, in the case of House members, with more limited access to the floor, as an "Extension of Remarks" to be printed in the Appendix to the Record. This procedure was frequently used to supplement countersubversive committee hearings and reports, either on the legislator's initiative or as a favor to a constituent or a colleague. Perhaps the most notable of all of these insertions was the publication in the Record of HUAC dossiers on the "Communist front records" of ten directors of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Such insertions were used to attack policy and legislative proposals by discrediting their supporters as subversive, as in the case of the civil rights debate of the fifties and early sixties; to execute an assigned role in a larger countersubversive intelligence campaign; and to recycle and authenticate with an official cachet ("documentation") for broader dissemination exposé material based on questionable sources.

But by the mid-seventies these offerings were reduced to a trickle, a consequence of the change in climate and a faltering in the momentum of countersubversion. The rise in the demand (for reasons already explored) was matched by a curtailment of the supply. What was needed was some central government source, which could process and disseminate printed material at the taxpayer's expense. Equally urgent was the need for a laundering function to consolidate and legitimize the reports of a network of "informants" and informers in place in leftist groups (like Sheila O'Connor), red squad operatives, and infiltrators from the ranks of the political right.

In addition to himself enjoying a haven from libel that he has resolutely refused to abandon when challenged, McDonald's methods help to reduce the libel fear generally of the exposé constituency. As we have seen, Ducote used a congressman to allay a journalist's concern about libel, and indeed, libel suits became an occupational hazard of the exposé trade in the sixties. While the fact that a subsequently distributed statement or characterization originated physically in the Congressional Record is no defense to a libel charge, it does embolden the timorous.
nations and crisis management; and commando liberation, an area in which the Defense Department has already organized a special assault capability. Combating terrorism through a program that features the development of intelligence resources is also a top FBI priority, along with organized crime, white-collar crime, and public corruption. The Bureau has restructured its domestic intelligence operations in a new Domestic Security-Terrorism Section of the Criminal Investigative Division. In congressional testimony and a press conference of March 1978, FBI Director William H. Webster stated that the "Bureau's domestic intelligence unit was under instructions to identify groups and movements with a potential for terrorism so as to be prepared for its emergence as a major factor in this country."

Federal intelligence preparations and activity have been especially intense in the nuclear field. The fear of "high-technology" terrorism has resulted in the creation of intelligence units by both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Intelligence Assessment Team) and the Department of Energy. The NRC-IAT has developed an interface with all other radical-watching elements of the domestic intelligence community. However, the present focus of these intelligence efforts by both the Energy Department and the NRC is not suspected terrorism but monitoring of anti-nuclear movements and activities by environmentalists and others concerned about nuclear proliferation. The IAT communicates such intelligence to utilities involved in nuclear projects, which have themselves through security departments become increasingly committed to surveillance programs, not for the purpose of defense against terrorism but to spy on and neutralize their opponents. A major goal of the intelligence community—both public and private—is putting terrorist trousers (ironically enough) on nonviolent anti-nuclear protest movements. A clue to this priority is the marketability of such intelligence as reflected in the NCLC's tactics (described above) in bidding for intelligence aid in attacking its rivals. Indeed, this group regularly denounces all forms of protest against nuclear power as "terrorism." 

In addition to private detective resources, utilities such as Georgia Power work closely with local police units which, as in the past when the federal presence was reduced, continue to conduct traditional anti-radical intelligence operations. These units have not escaped the criticisms and pressures that have forced a retreat in federal intelligence activities; but to an extent not possible on the federal level, they have invoked law enforcement, peacekeeping, and counterterrorism as covers for a continuation of their traditional radical watching.

It seems plain that, as in the past, these urban intelligence units, using deceptive covers, will dominate political intelligence, at least until a full restoration of a federal presence. It is in the cities and states that the tradition of countersubversion, renewed by social anxieties and the competition for power, is still strong. Surely it is a portent that in the 1978 race for governor of the
Notes for Chapter 13

File material about the Legion of Justice produced in the course of litigation as well as the fruits of further investigations by journalists are summarized in the following press stories:

Chicago Daily News:
- "Ex-terrorist Tells CIA Tim," Jan. 21, 1977;
- "Report Cops Aided a Right Wing Raid," April 8, 1975;
- "Seizures of Tapen, Film Told," April 8, 1975;
- "Rush Bullet One Target of Rightists," May 4, 1975;
- "Police Spies Tied to a Gas Bombings," May 4, 1975; and
- "Witness Links Cops to Terror Activities," July 22, 1975; "Working with Legion of Justice," July 22, 1975; "Terrorists' Ties to Cop Spies Told," July 23, 1975; "Spy Figure Told: Talk or Else . . . .

New York Times:
- "Testimony of Police Spy Figure Teller "Harasser of Anti-War Groups"" in October 1973; "People of the State of California v. Jerome Ducote," August 22, 1975; and on interviews by the author with some of the principals.

Chicago Tribune:
- "Robbery and Other Charges Dropped Against Informer in Police Spy Probe," June 15, 1975;
- "Testimony of Police Spy Figure Stricken," Aug. 13, 1975; and


