BOOKS BY MICHAEL MACDONALD MOONEY

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THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE
Connections Among Art, Money and Politics
by Michael Macdonald Mooney

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Acknowledgments

Originally I thought I would just write an article—no more than 2,500 words—for Harper's magazine. I was curious about what the National Endowment for the Arts might be doing. I certainly had no intention of spending three years wandering through the vast labyrinth of national cultural programs. I soon was required to learn how each program connected to many others; that national cultural objectives had been syndicated and incorporated; budgets could not even be estimated until combined with state, municipal, regional, county, foundation, university, and corporate funds—all of which were commingled; that the Federal Council on the Arts and the Humanities was coordinating more than 300 national programs.

To make my way through the corridors of politics in the arts I needed many guides. I am grateful to those who served as Ariadnes, to those who tutored, to those who supplied materials I used, to those who provided materials I could not use. I am grateful to the few singled out here for particular contributions; but also to many more I could not list because the catalogue of those who helped and encouraged would go on page after page. My thanks to all.

At the outset I decided to work from official documents—insofar as possible. I would interview only after I had studied the published records; but there was no bibliography as a benchmark from which to begin a survey; moreover, the central difficulty was that there were too many documents. There were no sources to trace the historical growth of the multiplying art programs; there was no index of materials; there were no summaries of national arts activities except the Cultural Directory, but no officer of national culture could identify to Congress what the agencies in the Cultural Directory did or spent, and no one in Congress knew. No one could supply an estimate of total federal expenditures, much less state or local amounts. Besides, almost all agencies of national culture conduct the significant portions of their meetings in secret, and when the minutes are not declared secret, they may not exist at all. In sum, I had
"doublethink" involved the use of doublethink; as soon as the Party could thrust its hand into the past and say of this or that event, it never happened—"that, surely, was more terrifying than mere torture and death."

"Reality Control" consisted of an unending series of victories over the community's memory, said Orwell. Precisely because there were never any H-bomb secrets at issue in the Progressive case, what was at stake was nothing more than the New Order's "visible means of control." On October 24, 1978, the Hon. Ronald V. Dellums, United States representative, 8th District, California, wrote a letter to the Department of Energy. Mr. Dellums was a member of the House Armed Services Committee and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Fiscal and Government Affairs. The Department of Energy had requested an increase in its budget for hundreds of millions of dollars to rebuild the plutonium production plant at Hanford, Washington, and to refurbish and restart the standby reactor at Savannah River, South Carolina. Mr. Dellums' letter attached a list of questions to Energy asking why Energy expected a shortage of plutonium in its nuclear weapons program: Would the neutron bomb, then going into production, require more plutonium? Were the new generations of missiles using multiple warheads the reason for the new facilities? There were other possibilities as well: were Energy's budgetary requests for additional plutonium production actually disguised requests for additional production of tritium to be manufactured by the South Carolina reactors, and then used as part of the production and design development of the "Tokamak" Fusion Test Reactor secretly operated by the NRC in Princeton, N.J.? Despite all the announcements to the contrary, had the administration made a secret deal with the energy industry to proceed with the Clinch River Breeder Reactor program? The questions posed by Congressman Dellums were questions, he said, for which the American people needed answers. Each option would involve both financial costs and social risks. The answers to Mr. Dellums' questions would have raised serious issues for public debate. After three weeks, Energy replied that it would not be possible to answer, because the list of questions posed by Mr. Dellums as an enclosure to his letter contained "Secret/Restricted Data." The Department of Energy thereupon declared that Mr. Dellums' questions were "Secret."

In such circumstances members of Congress, such as Dellums, had the privilege of declaring a "need to know." As soon as a member did so, however, he removed whatever it was he "needed to know" from the arena of public debate—which was precisely why Energy declared Dellums' questions "secret." What was secret was not secret because it was actually secret, but secret as a measure of "reality control." Similarly, when the publicity surrounding the Progressive case attracted other amateur H-bomb experts in the community, Justice zealously prosecuted some of these hobbyists, but not others. How Justice chose among possible candidates for prosecution for censorship illustrated that the New Order's legal arguments might appear to be somewhat contradictory or absurd, but its policy on dissent was consistent.

While Three Mile Island was melting down in March, 1979, and Justice was invoking the terrors of proliferation to Judge Robert W. Warren in the federal court in Milwaukee, Fusion magazine published an article titled "The Secret of Laser Fusion." In the March issue of Fusion the magazine's editors called attention to their article by noting that Energy Secretary Schlesinger might attempt legal prosecution of the magazine because the information in the article would be declared classified. "Therefore," said Fusion's editors, "we want to make it clear that this article is based on information made public by the Soviet Union and readily available in Soviet and other international scientific articles...."

Despite obvious similarities in the technical information provided by Fusion and the Progressive, Secretary Schlesinger did not provide any sworn affidavits as to the secrecy of the materials in Fusion. To the surprise of the editors of the Progressive, the publishers of Fusion then appeared with a brief amicus curiae before Judge Warren in Milwaukee. In the brief and affidavits the Fusion Energy Society, a pronuclear group, argued that the principles of thermonuclear weaponry were well known, as indeed they were. By repeating in substance the article it had already published, Fusion spread before the court essentially the same principles that the Department of Justice had declared to be continuing secrets, but no gag order issued from the court for any principles "classified at birth" by the Fusion Energy Society; nor were investigations for possible criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 announced by Justice; and, significantly, the Fusion affidavits were exempt from secrecy.

Curiously, the Fusion Energy Society and its magazine, Fusion, and the Fusion Energy Foundation, were largely secret organizations—as a result of Justice Department policies. To the extent that anything at all could be discovered, they appeared to be organizations founded, operated, and directed by an organization called the United States Labor Party. Headed by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., the United States Labor Party had sued the Department of Justice and the FBI in a civil action for interference with the United States Labor Party's "civil rights." In connection with the party's suits, the United States Labor Party won court orders in the Southern District of New York prohibiting the Justice Department from discussing the party with news reporters; and, in addition, sealing some 5,000 pages of FBI documents obtained by the United States Labor Party under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. The Department of Justice filed a motion for Summary Judgment against the U.S. Labor Party's suit in March, 1978, before Judge Mary Johnson Lowe, but until Judge Lowe's opinion was final and all remedies for appeal were ex-
hausted, the effect of the U.S. Labor Party suits was to keep secret everything the U.S. Labor Party could find out about itself after rummaging through its own FBI files.

Mr. LaRouche, however, was well known. In 1976 he declared that he was a candidate for president, and he declared again for 1980, but his party had suits pending against the Federal Election Commission over matching funds. While the Progressive case was pending, Howard Blum and Paul L. Montgomery of the New York Times wrote a two-part series on the U.S. Labor Party and Mr. LaRouche. Among the New York Times's allegations were that members of the U.S. Labor Party had undergone intensive training in “anti-terrorist” techniques at a camp in Powder Springs, Georgia, operated by Mitchell L. WerBell III. The training-camp farm of Mitch WerBell was notorious as a base for gunrunning, assassination devices, and other “spook” insanities. WerBell counted among his clients Batista of Cuba, Somoza of Nicaragua, and the sometime Costa Rican resident, Robert Vesco. According to the New York Times series by Blum and Montgomery, the U.S. Labor Party was deeply involved in “counter-terrorist” propaganda; had placed its own spies within the United States Council on Foreign Relations; was violently anti-Semitic; operated printing and programming corporations with revenues of $5 million and an impressive list of clients, including Mobil Corporation, Citibank, AT&T and the Ford Foundation; and had established a commercial private intelligence network. Beginning in 1976, the party voluntarily transmitted “intelligence” reports to the FBI and local police departments, including reports on the antinuclear movement. Reports on nuclear opponents were supposedly also furnished to nuclear power corporations, but by court order most of what could be learned about the U.S. Labor Party's peculiar activities was sealed, and therefore secret.

Obviously, Fusion magazine was ardently pronuclear. According to the New York Times articles, all monies gathered by the U.S. Labor Party's 1,000 or so active members through the sale of publications, and through donations raised from nuclear utilities, were transferred to party headquarters. But the Fusion Energy Foundation, publisher of Fusion, stated in its 1978 tax return that no part of the foundation's $103,897 income was used for “political purposes.” The magazine featured articles on how antinuclear groups planned violence; called those who opposed nuclear plants “storm troopers”; and suggested that perhaps sabotage might have been the real cause of the meltdown at Three Mile Island. Fusion supported the breeder reactor, and published photographs of the PDX Tokamak at Princeton's Plasma Physics Laboratory. Fusion published diagrams and explanations for various H-bomb designs. Although Mr. LaRouche's name did not appear on Fusion's masthead, Fusion prominently published LaRouche's theories on “the Human Condition.” His characterization of John Locke's doctrines—the fundamental theory underlying the United States Constitution—was that Locke's theories created societies of “tamed baboons.” Mr. LaRouche counted himself a Platonist, but brooked no questioning of his revelations. “All previous reality is cancelled,” he had said.

Regardless of what Fusion published or filed by affidavit with the court, neither Justice nor Energy seemed to take notice: what was secret and had to be gagged when published in the Progressive was apparently not secret when it appeared in Fusion. Samuel H. Day, Jr., managing editor of the Progressive and former editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, was forbidden to collect affidavits from scientists as to what was known about fusion in the public domain, because Day lacked approved security clearances. Fusion, on the other hand, published without prior restraints. According to Day, the first reporter to understand the connection was Joe Manning of the Milwaukee Sentinel. Manning condensed the technical language of “The Secret of Laser Fusion” from Fusion magazine, spent a week reading in the local library, and published an explanation of how the hydrogen bomb worked that was remarkably similar to Morland's.

Meanwhile, the Department of Justice was censoring the Progressive's affidavits haphazardly. Affidavits from four physicists at the Argonne National Laboratory about what was in the public domain were censored, but other references helpful to hobbyists slipped through. The ten-year-old article by Dr. Teller in the Encyclopedia Americana slipped into the court's open records. An affidavit submitted by a government witness, Jack Rosengren, a nuclear weapons design specialist, indicated that Morland's explanation in the Progressive described the most efficient H-Bomb in the U.S. stockpile. Since Justice failed to declare its own affidavit secret, the Rosengren affidavit slipped into the open record. Examining the contradictions in the government's case against the Progressive, and noting that Justice had introduced into the public domain materials that the Progressive had not, the four Argonne physicists wrote an angry letter to Senator John Glenn of Ohio. Within a month, Energy responded by declaring the letter secret.

Following these astounding events by newspaper in California, another lobbyist, Charles Hansen, decided to join the fray. Hansen was a California computer programmer whose only physics-related education consisted of two years of college-level engineering. Using clues supplied by Fusion, others from the government's own affidavits, from the references uncensored by Energy, and clues contained in a copy of the letter sent to Senator Glenn by the four Argonne physicists, Hansen began by sponsoring an H-bomb contest: the first design to be declared secret by the Department of Energy would be the winner. He mailed copies of the Argonne physicists' letter around the country. The Daily Californian at Berkeley printed the letter, and six other college newspapers followed suit.

Hansen then wrote an eighteen-page, single-spaced letter to Senator Charles H. Percy, Republican, Illinois. Hansen's letter, he said, was based
Order's purposes. The regulations stated that anyone who possessed "restricted data," whether that person obtained the data from the government, or by their own private initiatives from nongovernment sources—including the results of study, wonder, or intuition—could not "communicate" the restricted data to anyone else by publication or by talking to his neighbor across the backyard fence. "Restricted data" included all information—whether true or false—concerning: (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy.

The New Order's radical and extraordinary powers were asserted over all nuclear information—weapons, fuels, and the production of energy; and the basis for these powers, according to Justice, was that all "technical information" was exempt from the guarantees of the First Amendment. Such claims, of course, could not be supported by either law or precedent because there were no such laws and no such precedents. Instead, these were claims for radical and extraordinary social and political powers—social and political powers to determine the character of the national cultural policy, regardless of how the meaning of the word "culture" was defined. Energy was a central question of twentieth-century politics, but the regulation of all the corporate applications and all the university theories were to be centralized within the jurisdiction of one national agency. Spokesmen for the Department of Energy explained to those who complained of its $20 billion budget that more than a third of the Energy budget was spent to produce nuclear weapons. Yet, almost without exception, every leading theoretical scientist of nuclear physics, every advisory board to the Department of Energy or to the president, had continued to argue that a policy of secrecy was damaging not only to the social and political fabric of democracy, but to the initiatives of science as well.

Dr. Edward Teller argued that the habit of secrecy was a threat to national security. He pointed out that without secrecy, the United States had made spectacular advances in computer and electronic technologies, resulting in American "lead" in those fields of "technical information" over their Russian competitors; whereas in the supersecret nuclear fusion field, the United States lagged behind Soviet developments. The technical lag, said Teller, was a direct result of America's futile policy of secrecy. Dr. Teller wrote the New York Times in 1973: "Unfortunately, secrecy, once accepted, becomes an addiction—it is difficult to kick the habit. A false sense of 'security' that is engendered by secrecy has misled many people. Actually I am convinced secrecy is the enemy of scientific and technical progress all over the world, and violates the best traditions of the open society for our country."

Consistently, Dr. Teller advocated abandoning all forms of scientific and technical secrecy in the enlightened self-interest of the United States. Just as consistently, the Corps of the New Order ignored the advice of their own star witness, because the theoretical and practical arguments made by Dr. Teller against secrecy and for the benefits of nuclear power depended for their acceptance upon immediate and urgent social and political change—the same urgencies recommended by all six national commissions appointed to investigate Three Mile Island. The New Order's transcendental authorities were consistently exercised as sovereignties against the initiatives of change—urgent or not, technical or cultural, social or political. The Argonne scientists who filed affidavits in behalf of the Progressive did so because they were outraged by the radical powers to censor advanced by Justice. The Argonne scientists filed their affidavits to swear what existed in the public domain, and not because they agreed with either the politics or the social objectives of the Progressive. After they testified to what they knew to be community understandings, the Argonne scientists were subjected to investigations for criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act, and interrogated to determine whether they had "leaked" secret information. A security risk, by the New Order's radical definition, was anyone who "leaked" what the community had known for forty years.

Fusion magazine, on the other hand, supported the transcendental faith in nuclear development; therefore, even if it published "technical" information similar to the affidavits introduced by the Argonne physicists, Fusion was exempt from characterizations as a security risk or investigation for criminal conspiracy. Moreover, what Fusion magazine said was the "intelligence arm" of the prounuclear presidential candidacy of Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., collected "dossier" materials upon those who organized or contributed to antinuclear demonstrations. The Fusion Energy Foundation also published an Executive Intelligence Report from materials gathered from LaRouche's private "intelligence service." Executive Intelligence Report and its "dossier" materials were sold to officers of corporate nuclear utilities and, in addition, distributed to local police departments, the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, and the FBI. Intelligences reports gathered by Mr. LaRouche's organization were furnished to the FBI as confidential materials, but FBI "informants" on antinuclear activities were, of course, secret. The secrets of fusion were not actually secrets; what was secret were the political and ethical choices of the New Order.

Although the New Order's claims of secrecy over "all technical information" were in themselves strange, they were particularly odd when the expenses of secret events were to be paid from public tax monies. Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., the same subsidiary of Getty Oil Corporation that had somehow lost enough refined materials in one year to manufacture six atomic bombs—but lost the materials secretly—had previously occupied a plant site in West Valley, New York, not far from Buffalo. Between 1967 and 1968, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., hired approximately 1,400 men, most of them just over eighteen, as "sponges." The term