New Solidarity 10 JAN 1978
HITLER: RUNAWAY BRITISH AGENT
by Lyndon H. LaRouche. Jr.
WIESBADEN, West Germany, Jan. 7 (NSIPS) - U.S. Labor Party political historian Robert Cohen emphasizes the astonishing fact that the world officially refuses to recognize that Nazi Adolf Hitler was a "British agent," despite the massive, conclusive, and growing direct and circumstantial evidence which has been piling up on this point ever since Hitler proclaimed his British ideology and pro-British policies in the concluding pages of Mein Kampf.
Although the massive intellectual constipation of the Hitler issue cited by Cohen is the major part of the reason Western security agencies have failed to root out British-coordinated international terrorism, the current stupidity on the Soviet side is "bigger and better" than that on the side of the NATO countries.
Historian Cohen is continuing his preparation of a definitive research paper on the main point of the problem. Meanwhile, we shall focus here on the implications of the Hitler problem for the antiterrorism—and, anti-environmentalist—counteroffensive. Not without compassion, we also address ourselves implicitly to the painful declaration of one German Federal Republic official, in which he stated that the "rahmen"(1) of international terrorism was such that West German federal agencies could not root it out.
This problem is directly related to the lie published currently in Pravda, the lie which argues that it was the United States, and not the Churchill-centered forces of Britain, which initiated the Cold War. Not accidentally, dupes and Arbatovian liars writing in Pravda cite both London sources and such British intelligence links as neo-Fabian Richard Barnet, the close associate of Zbigniew Brzezinski, as included "authority" for these gross falsehoods. As Robert Cohen shows, working from the official U.S. and other files of the World War II period, it was Churchill and his protégé Anthony Eden who played the decisive role in influencing reluctant United States to drop the A-bomb on Japan, just as it was Churchill who forced through the criminal terror bombing of the non-military target, Dresden.
For the sake of defense of the continental European economy from evil British schemes afoot, and for a more effective counteroffensive against British international terrorism, certain relevant features of the character of Hitler as a runaway British agent ought to be cleared up immediately.
The Third Reich: Nazism Versus Nationalism
As a British agent, Adolf Hitler originally belonged to the same general part of the British intelligence network spectrum as Henry Kissinger's sponsor Fritz Kraemer, a somewhat different part of the British intelligence network spectrum in post-Versailles Germany represented otherwise variously by Karl Radek, Karl Korsch, and Pannekoek "ultra-left" varities. The concluding sections of Hitler's Mein Kampf express viewpoints which precisely correlate with his British intelligence network pedigrees.
The Nazi movement itself, like the British intelligence controlled "ultra-left" penetration of the Communist Party was a conscious replication of the Phrygian Dionysian cult tactic used by the British, through agents Danton and Marat, in the destabilization of France during the early 1790s, and also used in many other situations. These forces did not then, or now, reflect a British political commitment, but were rather Britain’s "disposable instrument" to be discarded and crushed once their usefulness to British policies is deemed outlived.
One further point of clarification Concerning 1920s Germany must be emphasized. Many influential Germans of the post-Versailles period adapted at one point or another to the dictates of the occupying armistice powers, principally therefore to British policies. Some of these acted at one point or another as allies of virtual agents of British services and networks, but without ever giving up a deeper-lying desire to act according to their perception of Germany's industrially centered interest. Hence, a rigorous distinction must be made between those who acted for a time as British agents in that special way and those who were essentially British intelligence tools, such as Adolf Hitler or Karl Korsch.
German experience during the postwar period is a useful point of reference for understanding the post-Versailles period. During the postwar occupation under conditions of "unconditional surrender," German influentials were obliged to adapt in various ways to the pleasure of the occupying powers. Our intelligence people who lived through that period most certainly understand this, at least privately. The fact that so-and-so was nominally or objectively an agent of some external power—or, did this or that—during that period is not in itself a "mark of Cain" to the present day.
During 1932-33, Hjalmar Schacht with the backing of his sponsors in London, and London's collaborators in New York City, forced Germany's industrial interests to capitulate to the British "Hitler solution." However, in submitting to Hitler the majority of Germany did not become Nazi in character. In assimilating the German nationalist apparatus into the Nazi political machine, Hitler was obliged to adapt somewhat to their German nationalist forces. The Deutschtuemelei (2) of Joseph Goebbels’ Wuenschkonzert(3) during the war, nationalist, sentimentalist entertainment essentially free of Nazi propaganda is one of many evidences illustrating this point. Naturally the Wehrmacht was, and continued to be, the most powerful single institutionalized representative of German nationalist resistance to Nazi impulses.
There is the useful comparison to be made between the German submission to Hitler in 1932-33 and the recent U.S. Wall Street Journal self-prostration before the London Economist demands for "unconditional surrender" to Lazard Brothers of London—and implicitly British environmentalists and terrorism. U.S. pro-industrialist nationalism is not suddenly uprooted and eliminated by such developments.
During the initial period of the Hitler regime, 1933-1936 —the Schacthian period—that regime was essentially a British puppet regime on all points. During 1936-37, even leading elements of the German labor and other ministries of the Nazi regime warned Hitler that Schacht's policies were depleting German labor and industrial potential at such rates that the early doom of German ability to produce was in sight if this continued. Thus, German national interests, reality, penetrated through even the Nazi administration in this and related ways.
The coincidence between the policies of Hitler's Mein Kampf and the Keynesian austerity policies of Schacht should be noted and emphasized respecting the 1933-36 period.
The dumping of Schacht during that period of crisis represents the first significant tendency of Hitler to become a "breakaway British agent."
The character of the Nazi regime thereafter, from 1936 through to its doom of 1945, was determined as a continuous conflict between Nazism and German nationalism, unfortunately with the confines and political geometry of Nazi characteristics.
The solution to the crisis of 1936-1938 Germany was dumping not only Schacht, but also the Hitler gang. This perception centered in the command of the Wehrmacht, which discreetly made preparations to that purpose up until the aftermath of the Austrian Anschluss.
Britain did not turn away from Hitler at this juncture. Despite the dumping of Schacht, the Chamberlain Administration and British intelligence acted in crucial ways to prevent the Wehrmacht from eliminating the Hitler gang. (Meanwhile, during the 1936-1938 period British intelligence accelerated its active support and control of anti-Hitler networks inside and outside Germany, including total control of the terrorist-centered Communist International apparatus and the Rote Kapelle operation.
British influence was marginally decisive in preventing French intervention in the remilitarization of the Rhineland. Two or three French divisions casually strolling across tie German border at that juncture would have effected tie immediate elimination of the Hitler gang.
British influence inside the apparatus of the Benito Mussolini regime—an Italian fascist regime British intelligence had created—and British influence in Austria including control of Interpol, aided the Anschluss.
Admiral Wilhelm Canaris and leading elements of the Wehrmacht had operations in place for the abrupt eliminating of the Hitler problem prior to Anschluss and this Czechoslovakia crisis. On direct orders from Winston Churchill—the Wehrmacht plot against Hitler was aborted. Most notorious is Neville Chamberlain and French Minister Daladier's role at the Munich summit.
The background and indications of Munich are too little acknowledged generally.
The plot to forge papers against both the Soviet General Staff and key Wehrmacht officers was, according to Oxford British intelligence sources, nominally and originally a project of Heydrich's Sicherheitsdienst (SD) office. At first, Oxford reports, Admiral Canaris succeeded in killing this project, which Churchill later caused to be reactivated. The result was the forging of the documents leading to the decapitation of the Soviet General Staff.
The British motivation for the elimination of Tukachevsky was the so-called "Tukachevsky Plan," which had been supported personally by Stalin, who had caused direct approaches to be made to relevant British and French authorities. This Tukachevsky plan was the countermeasure by which allied Czechoslovak, Soviet, French, and British capabilities could be utilized for crushing Nazi Germany quickly and militarily under such contingency (pretext of causus belli) as the Czechoslovak crisis. Ironically, with aid of British agent of influence Benes, Tukachevsky was thrown out. The British and French repudiated the Tukachevsky plan offered tentatively by Stalin. Chamberlain and Daladier backed Hitler at Munich. Czechoslovakia was crushed.
The key to Munich is simple and direct. As British agent Adolf Hitler reflected in Main Kampf, British policy behind British interests in Hitler's Nazis was a contingency plan for sending Germany military forces east against the Soviet Union in British interests. Together with Hitler's closest, most pro-British associates, such as Goering and Hess, Hitler conceived this drang nach osten (4) as a de facto alliance of his forces with those of his British patrons.
The connection of Hess and Goering to British intelligence is, of course, most clear. Goering's Swedish connections are relevant illustrations of that case. Hess, associated with the Haushofer circles otherwise identified with Houston Chamberlain, exemplifies the nature of that case.
However, British commitment to Hitler was that of conditional commitment to a tool of British policy, not loyalty to Hitler as an integral, enduring feature of British interest. Britain intended to move into the Ruhr as soon as the Wehrmacht had exhausted itself in Britain's service against the Red Army in the East. German military intelligence and German nationalism acted upon that feature of the issue, striking into Scandinavia—as a precautionary measure against an impending takeover in Norway—and followed this with a strike to the west. During 1939-41, there was a sound and intense German nationalist enthusiasm in Germany for defeating Britain, but horror against an eastern front from the outset, even before the development of winter 1942 and the later Stalingrad battles. A number of curious events intervened to prevent the conquest of France from being followed by the defeat of England.
First, the curious affair of Dunkirk. Although British intelligence sources credit Canaris with holding back Guderian tanks, considering Washington, D.C. archives' evidence, this is not proven to the point that Canaris's responsibility can be put down as factual. It is certain that the order came through Adolf Hitler's office, countermanding Wehrmacht orders.
Second, Goering's strategically nonsensical "terror bombing" of London. This set up the Luftwaffe in kind of a British shooting gallery. Strategically significant Luftwaffe actions against British military capabilities were prevented by the London bombing policy. Although the actual bombing damage inflicted on London was marginal, the propaganda effect of that bombing was to mobilize British political commitments to war in a way which would not otherwise have developed at the time.
These two matters, which have astonished not only German military historians ever since, are the leading elements of a broad range of occurences to the same effect.
The initial success of the Wehrmacht in Barbarossa is also relevant to the proper astonishment of military historians on highlights of Nazi conduct of the war against England. Stalin was, with good reason, so certain that it would be absolute folly for the Nazis to attack the Soviet Union before first defeating Britain that Stalin left the Red Army flat-footed for the Barbarossa attacks. If Stalin had not been caught by surprise in that way, if the Red Army had been deployed for immediate war, the Nazi defeat in the East would have occurred much earlier than it did in fact.
Documentary evidence from the 1930s and late 1940s shows that Stalin was by then keenly aware of the nature of British intelligence and the policies of forces behind that intelligence. Thus, during 1940 and 1941, Stalin judged Churchill warnings of Hitler's drive eastward as British provocations intended to save Britain's situation by fomenting a Nazi-Soviet "premature" conflict. Stalin's political-strategic criteria were broadly sound in this matter, but overlooked crucial additional points, and did not recognize the depth and nature of British intelligence influence within the Nazi regime itself, most notably.
In all these events, within Germany itself, the interplay of German nationalism versus Nazism was in a Nazi structure, a Nazi institutional geometry, which caused the process to unfold in a different way that if Germany had been homogeneously Nazi or if nationalist forces had broken through to free themselves of the Nazi "geometry."
The "Breakaway Ally"
Adolf Hitler is the exemplary mode! of the "runaway" British ally or agent. A mere British agent is automatically promoted an agent-of-influence, as Hitler was, by being sponsored into a leading position in a non-British government. The mere British agent as such, as Hitler was during his initial period as a fascist spokesman, can follow the specific interests of his controllers. As such an agent is promoted to positions of greater influence in a non-British nation, it is impossible for that agent to ignore the implications of the enlarged constituency. The agent then becomes an agent of influence, who must attempt to bring his nation into postures to British advantage, but within the constraints determined by the interplay of conflicting forces within the enlarged constituency he has acquired.
In the Hitler case, following the 1936-38 crisis within Nazi Germany, two principal considerations resulted in Hitler's becoming London's "runaway ally." From London's side, its interests demanded Hitler's taking courses of action from which London must dissassociate British responsibility even to the point of the 1939 declaration of war upon the Nazi regime that was still, at that moment, London's "breakaway" ally. On the side of the Third Reich the "runaway ally" became rapidly an institution thai lawfully ran out of British control, such that the former British instrument became Britain's deadly principal adversary.
The essence of this qualitative shift in the Third Reich's cause was Hitler's needed effort to channel German national interest and sentiments into support of Nazi purposes and projects.
It is notable that London strategists, the U.S. Rand Corporation (a British-created institution), and such figures as Henry Kissinger have extensively elaborated proposed "runaway ally" scenarios for Israel and other nations, including the Latin American "Second War of the Pacific" scenarios associated with the Rand Corporation's Einaudi. This is to say that London has learned nothing of importance from its former dabbling with Hitler as a "runaway ally:" This flaw in London's perception we have previously identified as the "Frankenstein monster principle."
The fundamental interest of German nationalism was to eliminate Hitler. This was still feasible prior to Munich, 1938. After 1938, it became impossible—so, German nationalists are not individually to be blamed in reality for what Nazi Germany did after Munich 1938. Britain is to be blamed for this, since Britain set into motion those forces up through 1938 which no force within Germany could control after Munich 1938. If there had been true justice at Nuremberg, Churchill and Chamberlain would have led the list of those condemned to be hanged.
Failing to eliminate Hitler, German nationalist impulses were channeled into the outlet of expression which the geometry of Nazi institutions and the institution of war made available. The Goebbel's Wuenschkonzert exemplifies such a channeling of nationalist impulses into the Nazi war effort.
Hence, German nationalism forced the military drive to the West whereas Nazism exploiting the pressures of the internal German economy—the need for new sources of loot—governed the subsequent drive east. Rudolf Hess's flight-to England is a distilled expression of the essence of Nazism on this point, Contained within Nazi Germany, as a result of British influence, German nationalism could express itself only in the heteronomic, Nazi-shaped perception of German interests versus all non-German nations, and nationalities.
England was then, as now, the enemy of continental Europe, including the German nation. Nazism was the "runaway ally" of London, an "ally" which could maintain control of Germany only by adapting itself to a deformed expression of German nationalism.
This sort of development must replicate itself in every instance of the application of the "runaway ally" tactic by London or such British-influenced U.S. forces as those around Henry Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski. Once the agent has subjugated a nation, as London's Adolf Hitler subjugated Germany, and attempts then, to set the subjugated forces into motion for desperate enterprises, the real interests of the nation express themselves, in however distorted a form, within the shaping and realization of policies. Hence, German nationalism was degraded into a Nazi form of expression of its real interest impulses, forced the "runaway ally" Hitler to become London's most deadly enemy in the way this occurred.
Moscow too, has learned nothing of importance from the Hitler experience—if post May-June 1977 Moscow policies are the basis for estimate. London is currently attempting to do to the United States what London did installing Adolf Hitler in power in Germany. Moscow is currently falling into support of that evil game, a game which leads at a rapid rate towards a general thermonuclear war.
London is overtly committed to transforming the United States into a fascist state. At this moment, industrial and financial forces within the United States are capitulating, one by one, to such modern London-backed new Hjalmar Schachts as Lazard's Felix Rohatyn, and capitulating in the same way that German nationalist interests capitulated to Schacht's Hitler project during 1932-1933. Step by step these forces, as illustrated by the case of the cited Wall Street Journal capitulation, are joining the fascist bandwagon—discarding the future of the United States and themselves in favor of some perceived very short-term heteronomic benefits.
In this process, Moscow is supporting London against the vital national interests of the United States—and Moscow's own most vital interests. Moscow is being just as stupid in its own way as responsibles such as the Wall Street Journal editorial writer was in his way.
Either this ceases—or the world should now dig in for thermonuclear hell. To those who will not ally with the Labor Committee forces to stop this, we say, without risk of exaggeration: By your foolish conduct you indicate that you are morally unfit to survive—and perhaps, if you succeed in your present course of folly you shall not survive for very long.
(1) Rahmen: scope, background
(2) Deutschtuemelei: the German nationalists' highly romantic idealization of everything German.
(3) Wuenschkonzert: a "command performance," in this specific case an institution which allowed for the expression of German nationalism without the individual, be he an industrialist, worker, or military man, having to consciously com mil himself to the Nazi Party or program. Through such an institution. Goebbels was able to channel the nationalist sentiment into the Germ an war effort.
(4) drag nach osten: Drive to the east