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"Option A: If the United States continues the monetary, economic, and defense-budget policies now in force, by 1988, the Soviet empire will have the degree of strategic superiority needed to launch, survive, and win a general "first strike" assault against the United States with degrees of losses acceptable to the Soviet command, on condition that the U.S.A. does not adopt a "launch on warning" doctrine. For this case, Plan A is sufficient for Soviet war-economy mobilization.
Option B: However, in the case, that the United States not only adopts "launch on warning," but also unleashes those changes in monetary, economic, and budgetary policies needed for implementation of an SDI "crash program," Plan A would fail.
If the Soviets knew, that the U.S.A. had adopted a "launch on warning" doctrine, then a Soviet "first strike," a crucial feature of the maximum option under the Ogarkov Plan, would not be possible as early as 1988. At the earliest, Soviet "first strike" would be postponed to the 1990s, awaiting the deployment of a more advanced generation of Soviet BMD than is projected for deployment by approximately 1988.
If Soviet ability to survive and win a general war is postponed from the 1987-89 interval to the 1990-92 interval, as U.S. "launch on warning" would tend to have this effect, and if the U.S. also turns to a "crash program" implementation of SDI, Soviet Plan A war-economy mobilization would be disastrous for Moscow's ambitions. On this account, the Soviet planners are introducing Plan B rapidly and most forcefully at this time." (2)
"After 1988, according to Plan A reasoning, the relative advantage to the Soviets will erode at an accelerating rate, unless NATO military capabilities and economies collapse of their own weight. [...] Assume also, that the U.S. revises its monetary and economic, as well as military-budget policies, to foster a general economic recovery and increased SDI expenditures. Under that condition, the logic of Plan A appears to be problematic for the Soviets. Against that contingency, Moscow is obliged to begin shifting rapidly from Plan A to Plan B. In that case, then 1988 is no longer a maximum point of relative strength for Moscow, but, rather, the date of maximum strength is shifted to a later date, to a critical point during the early to middle 1990s." (1)
"There are sources of troubles inside the Warsaw Pact, and in Soviet society itself. Soviet society is inherently a very violent society, whose culture prescribes periodic convulsions. "Plan B" efforts will increase the potential for such convulsions, as we have indicated. However, the likelihood that either the Warsaw Pact or Soviet society itself will begun to crumble internally very soon, is so small as to be almost non-existent under present conditions. [...] True, assuming that the Soviet empire was extended to domination of the nominally independent satrapies of today's western Europe, as well as the Middle East, the Soviet empire must crumble eventually, as all oligarchical empires of the form of the Mesopotamian models have crumbled internally in the past. Those who speak wishfully of such as early-future prospects, under present correlations of forces, are doubly dangerous, as they sow Neville Chamberlain-like complacency among us, and prompt the Soviets to desire war more urgently, as the alternative to western meddling in the internal order of eastern Europe.
In the present term, our attention to troubles within the Soviet empire must be less wishfully ambitious, more precise, and more practical. It is important to watch closely the frictional impulses of cultural and policy conflicts, impulses not likely to cause the Soviet empire to crumble during the forseeable future, but impulses which will affect greatly the way in which Soviet policy and performance shift marginally during the period ahead. The cultural and policy conflicts arising in the overlay of "Plan A" and "Plan B" are the best choice of bench-mark for such observations and analysis." (1)
1. THE TWO QUALITATIVE FACETS OF SOVIET STRATEGIC MOBILIZATION UNDER THE OPERATIONAL OGARKOV PLAN; by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.; in the MORNING BRIEFING & EIR Special Report; June 24, 1985.
2. Preface to "Global Showdown, The Russian Imperial War Plan for 1988; by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.; EIR Special Report; July 24, 1985.