Editor's note - The following article is the opening chapter of Finally, The Real Karl Marx!, a book documenting the important influence of the American Revolution and its leaders - particularly Benjamin Franklin - on the German institutions and thinkers who shaped the world outlook of Karl Marx. Other chapters in the book. to which occasional references are made in this article, will include "Gneisenau and Scharnhorst: The Break," and "The American Influence on the Young Beethoven." Additional appendices in the book will include "The Civil War - The Last Attempt to Establish a Capitalist Republic," by Allen Salisbury. Several authors are collaborating with Mr. LaRouche on Finally, The Real Karl Marx !, which is scheduled for publication by University Editions, a division of Campaigner Publications, in 1978.

Like most citizens today, Karl Marx was ignorant of the most crucial facts of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries' closely intertwined European and American history. That ignorance of the very traditions which directly formed his lifelong world outlook during his youth compels us to judge Karl Marx as first among those many other scholars of "the young Marx" who, to this date, are still occupied with their own efforts to discover the real origins of his outlook and method.
More than a matter of scholarly curiosity is at issue on this point. Exemplary is the fact that had Marx not been ignorant of his own political roots, especially of the powerful indirect influence of the American Revolution on his childhood development, he could not have committed the fundamental historical errors which flawed his adult work on history and political economy.
During the late eighteenth century, and continuing into the nineteenth century, all of the key urban centers of the Rhineland, parts of southern Germany, and centers such as Weimar, were dominated by the influence of the American Benjamin Franklin and Franklin's Illuminati and Freemason collaborators. Cologne, Bonn, Coblenz, Mainz. and Marx' s own home city Trier were hotbeds of the same general tendencies of humanist republicanism represented by Franklin, Tom Paine, Turgot, Condorcet, Lavoisier, and Priestley. The influential Herder, who played a leading role in the effort to spread Franklin's ideas and writings throughout Germany, exemplifies the common active links of Franklin' s included influence among such figures as Beethoven' s childhood teacher Neefe and Schiller and Mozart.
Marx himself was most strongly influenced by these humanist currents. The director of the gymnasium at which the young Marx studied during the period 1830-1835 was one Johann Hugo Wyttenbach who, although otherwise predominantly a Kantian, professed Benjamin Franklin as the strongest influence on his thought. The literary and political society, the Kasinogesellschaft, of which Marx' s father and future father-in-law were members, was a hotbed of "German Saint-Simonism" and anti-Prussianism and also fervently anti-Napoleonic. To one who knows the epistemological characteristics of the humanists around Franklin's leadership, a reading of Marx's 1835 Aufsatz for school director Wyttenbach leaves no margin for doubt concerning the roots of the young Marx' s own development.
Admittedly, some researchers are confused by the near-simultaneity of anti-Prussian and pro-Prussian views among Marx' s father and associates. Their confusion on this point arises because they lack perception of the way in which German humanists understood (somewhat correctly) the highlights of the French Revolution. Contrary to modern mythology, which dates the "right turn" of the French Revolution to the Ninth of Thermidor, the German humanists, like the American Federalists, had seen many of their leading cothinkers sent to the guillotine by British agents-demagogues Danton and Marat, and viewed Napoleon (rightly) as so much a reactionary that the German republicans, being otherwise devoutly anti-Prussian, followed Gneisenau and Scharnhorst willingly and vigorously into an alliance with Prussia against the "greater evil."
Marx's own ignorance respecting his immediate predecessors' history was neither astonishing nor by any means exceptional for his or later times.
The great upsurge of Franklin's influence in Europe was quite literally chopped off with the guillotining of Lavoisier and the death of Condorcet. By the end of the second decade of the nineteenth century, the events of . the Jacobin Terror and the subsequent obscenities of Napoleon had wiped out the humanist movement as an organized force. Saint-Simon' s fevered efforts to revive the influence of the American Federalists in Europe was but a faint echo of the great, latershattered humanist movement of which Saint-Simon and his father had been a part.
G.W.F. Hegel, himself a product of the preceding south German humanist ferment of the eighteenth typifies the tendency unloosed among German humanist leaders by Napoleon' s disgusting compromise with the Hapsburgs and his anointing himself Emperor, Like the humanist Illuminati and republican Scharnhorst, Hegel allied his forces with Prussia against Napoleon, and, to that extent, indirectly made peace with the great enemy of all humanism, the English house of Guelph. Beethoven' s instinct is shown in his efforts at composing a symphony celebrating Wellington's victory, a travesty all Beethoven's admirers are happier to forget. Beethoven's soul was not in it.
Into the circumstances following the Treaty of Vienna emerged the historical fraud composed by Madame de Stael, and the embellishment of the same fraud by the scurrilous Lamartine. All modern histories of the French Revolution in general use, including those so-called historians admired by the despicable French Communist Party leadership, faithfully follow in the pattern set by the frauds of de Stael and Lamartine, the myth of theNinth of Thermidor. Madame de Stael was otherwise the daughter of Louis XVI's last finance minister, Swiss bankers' agent Necker. It was Necker who sabotaged the French economy by undoing the work of V ergennes and Turgot, and who, in the service of the foreign bankers and the worse aristocrats. shaped the monstrous financial crisis which unleashed the French Revolution. At one point, underlining Necker' s real sympathies, his daughter was projected to marry William Pitt the Younger. Madame de Stael' s fraudulent French history reveals her to be nothing but a conscious agent of influence of the same forces around Pitt and Bentham for whom the Jacobin terror's demagogues, Danton and Marat, were agents.
With Madame de Stael's, and kindred fraudulent accounts of French history went the spread of the myth of "liberal" England as the purest and most advanced expression of capitalist development, and the complementary fraud to the effect that the United States was more or less in the condition children' s fantasy writer Karl May later still imagined it to be. Under the spell of the prevailing myths of the times, and with significant added disorientation contributed by Friedrich Engels, Marx swallowed the fraudulent account of eighteenth century (and earlier) political economic history and included those gross blunders into the empirical axiomatics of his interpretations of both history and political economy.
This problem of Marx-scholarship has been aggravated to an extreme degree by Communist as well as social-democratic historians. Any scholar acquainted with the most basic facts concerning European and American history from the thirteenth through nineteenth centuries, leafing through the appendices of publications of the Soviet Institute of Marxism-Leninism, meets wholesale batches of classifications of key figures from those centuries which are, in the main, out of correspondence with all reality. It should be stressed that this ignorance of history among such Communists is only an echo of the equally bad or worse frauds faithfully retaught as history in the public schools and universities of Western Europe and North America.
These criticisms are in no sense a matter of mootable differences of interpretation. If one turns to primary sources from the periods in question in each case, there is no correspondence between the prevailing characterization presently given in public schools and universities and the fact of the matter. What accredited textbook accounts provide is not an ac count and interpretation from study of the best sources, but rather a piling of commentator's gossip upon irresponsible gossip with no adequate attention to ample sources more or less readily available. The prevailing account$ of history are layers upon layers of so-called scholarly opinion concerning a mass of socalled scholarly opinion. Tracing these layers of socalled scholarship back to their point of origin, one consistently encourters some deliberate fraud, such as the cited work of Madame de Stael.


For example : Did Marx, as is asserted, discover the "labor theory of value"? He did not. He rediscovered it. The first systematic, published elaboration of the "labor theory of value" was U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton's Report on Manufactures, presented to the U.S. Congress in 1791, and was the basis for official United States government economic policy until approximately 1829 Hamilton, the first to used in publication the same method Marx employed to the same purpose in Theories of Surplus Value, refuted the British physiocratic doctrine of ground rent to prove that technological progress in increasing the productive powers of labor was the only continuing source of new wealth.
Does this suggest that Marx wittingly or unwittingly plagiarized Hamilton? We have not yet established that the republication of Hamilton' s Report on Manufactures was among the books the American Whig economist Henry Carey sent to Marx together with his own writings. As Allen Salisbury documents the problem in the appendices,* Marx allowed his stubborn prejudices concerning English capitalist development to prevent himself from attaining competent know ledge of either the American Revolution or the early decades of United States history - Hence, Marx refused to see that Carey, brilliantly developing. further Hamilton's own "labor theory of value," had demolished Marx's error of concession to Smith and Ricardo on the subject of ground rent.

* Allen Salisbury, "The Civil War - The Last Attempt to Establish a Capitalist Republic," serialized in New Solidarity, Vol. VIII, No. 27 (May 31, 1977), p. 4, and Vol. VIII, No. 28 (June 3, 1977), p. 7, "The Civil War - The Last Attempt to Establish a Capitalist Republic" will appear as an appendix in Finally, The Real Karl Marx !

However, Marx did base the development of his conception of expanded reproduction on Dr. Quesnay' s work, not knowing that the forces of the American Revolution and French humanists Turgot, Condorcet, et al. were students of Quesnay. Although there can be no doubt that Marx did not in any way plagiarize Hamilton to develop the labor theory of value, it is obvious that Marx's later independent rediscovery of Hamilton' s principle was not accidental. Marx depended significantly on the same genre of sources which led directly into Hamilton' s work.
A direct study of source docum ents within their original context clearly establishes on all other points, as in this case, the truth of the historical problems involved.
A second major problem confronting Marx and Engels was their effort to reconcile the myth of the Ninth of Thermidor with their commendable hostility toward all ultra-left anarchist and similar declasse and lumpen-political-refuse doctrines and political tendencies. Concretely, wherever Marx confronted a variant of the ideological traditions of Danton and Marat in real life, he attacked these obscenities without compromise, yet, he clung to the myth of the Ninth of Thermidor all the same.
This blunder causes no systematic error of note in Marx' s own positive theoretical or practical work. However, Marx' s failure to reject the myth itself created the opening for such influential travesties as Franz Mehring's history of the labor movement. In Mehring, rigorous historiographical criteria are cast aside in favor of an indiscriminate, maudlin pawing over every jacquerie within the centuries covered by Mehring' s purported history. Although Mehring would have been early to look with abhorrence and hatred against today's neo-Fabian scoundrels, his romantic sentimentality contributed significantly to fostering the current which produced the Proletkult obscenity and the modern views of "The Left" which find a commonality among both honest socialists and outright fascists of the Maoist and kindred types.
However, back to Marx's cultural roots.


It is all fine and necessary, in studying minds such as that of Karl Marx or Ludwig van Beethoven, to focus on all the literary remains directly associated with them. However, if the investigation is left at that, no competent conclusions can be reached concerning the crucial formative influences on their development. Nor is much gained by Freudian or pseudo-Freudian study of their immediate family relations. One must study the direct literary remains associated with the person, of course. However, these sources become properly significant after one has broadened the investigation to situate these figures in their historical cultural setting in the places in which they were raised.
For example, in the case of Beethoven studies; it has been shocking to discover that, previously, no Beethoven researcher has appropriately studied Bonn humanist culture during the 1770-1790 period. Instead of looking at Bonn of the 1770-1790 period only from Beethoven as an individual point of reference, reverse the procedure. Beethoven was a conscious humanist Promethean image - as was Karl Marx. Where were the Promethean humanist cultural influences around Bonn, and where do these intersect Beethoven' s experience there? Bonn University was a hotbed of the Illuminati, and Beethoven's teacher, Neefe, a member of the Illuminati. Bonn was one of the centers of Herder' s circulation of Franklin' s influence into Germany during the peri'od Beethoven was there. The evidence of Beethoven' s fully conscious identification with the Franklin-linked Illuminati is clear once one knows what evidence is crucial - including the estate catalogue of his personal library.
It is for that reason that we include a chapter on the case of Beethoven in a text otherwise devoted to the roots of Karl Marx' s development. Two interrelated issues are involved here. The foremost issue is that all known extant appreciations of Marx' s cultural origins are profoundly wrong, as we show. That prevailing blunder cannot be separated from the characteristic' errors of the historiographical method slavishly, wrongly employed by the investigators in question. The cases of Beethoven and Marx - as most studies of both directly reflect the same general type of historiographical incompetence - are therefore linked in a double way. Not only do Beethoven and Marx ultimately share the same intellectual roots, but the error commonly made on this point in both cases is of an identical form.
Consequently, by showing how the same proper methods, of investigation apply to both cases, we are demonstrating the essential thrust of the method which must be adopted by all historians who prefer not to be judged professionally incompetent hereafter.
As we show in the text as a whole, the fundamental point of reference from which to study that process of transformation which we call history is epistemology. In particular, epistemology must not be treated in terms of collections of specific points of policy and belief, but as ultimately occupied with the relatively transfinite - in Georg Cantor' s sense of that term in respect to the possible array of beliefs and politics it orders in each of the various sets of circumstances.
An epistemological current, as we define it here, operates as a kind of transinvariant, a kind of constant ordering principle, which determines the way one set of beliefs evolves into a different set of beliefs.
The successive sets of belief ordered in this way may each be studied to define a characteristic world outlook for practice. The characteristic world outlook of such a distinguished set of beliefs may, at first inspection, be in opposition to or otherwise inconsistent with the characteristic world outlook of the set of beliefs which precedes it. We might presume, for this reason, that the two sets of beliefs are thus unrelated as world outlooks. In some instances, this may, in fact, be the case; however, such evidence is not conclusive in itself. At a higher - or, if you prefer, deeper - level of epistemological investigation, we may discover that two opposing sets of belief are subsumed by what we might call a common organizing principle, such that that organizing principle is in some way fundamentally distinct from the same notion of organizing principle as adduced for different arrays of world outlooks.
It is that organizing principle which we equate with the notion of transfinite or transinvariant.
Notably, this perception was approximated by G.W.F. Hegel in the notion of the Logos as undergoing a process of unfolding. development, such that through successive evolutions in this way it subsumed specific world outlooks which were not im mediately reconcilable with one another, outlooks which corresponded to distinct, qualitative stages of the development of human societies. Although our limited degree of agreement with Hegel on this point is relevant to the discussion, there is a double error in Hegel' s conception of the Logos. On the most obvious side of the matter, the standpoint of historical fact, Hegel erred wildly in assuming that the accounted order of the succession of ruling forms of Mediterranean society represented a necesary succession in terms of a positive unfolding of the Logos's self-development. Hegel committed the error of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. However, more profoundly, Hegel erred in his conception of a single Logos principle. He failed to recognize that there are (mainly) at least three fundamental, distinct ordering principles interreacting in determining the course of human intellectual development.
Although Marx rejected the more simplistic distinctions of idealism and materialism which brutally flaw the literary productions of the Soviet Institute of Marxism-Leninism, he veered significantly, and Engels more notably, toward that disorienting perception. In fact, idealism and materialism as epistemological categories (as generating or ordering principles) are sheer nonsense in the light of any competent study of the history of Mediterranean and European thought. These nonsense categories are not the transinvariants of epistemology.
In the approximately two-and-one-half-thousand years of Mediterranean civilization, there are three basic ordering principles which qualify as transinvariants. We give their paired names; the first name of each of these three is the classical archetype, the second the European epistemological name. These are Apollonian-Aristotelian (Euclidean, non-Euclidean), Dionysian-nominalist (monetarist, empiricist), and Promethean-Neoplatonic.
It is clear that Hegel intended to make an approximation of the Neoplatonic principle the equivalent of his universal Logos. This side of the matter shows Hegel at his relative best. He correctly perceived that the Neoplatonic outlook was the only one which converged on universal reality (natural law). This was not remarkable, since Hegel, like Beethoven and Marx, was a product of Neoplatonic influences. However, insofar as Hegel was correct in this aspect of his impulses, he wrongly - inadequately - judged the nature (and the historical efficacy) of the anti-Neoplatonic currents.
The study of these three generating principles depends upon understanding the mirror relationship between those outlooks, as a method of knowledge-for practice, and as a mode by which the individual determines his or her sense of personal social identity. This is crucial to the two principal subjects, Beethoven and Marx. considered here. The issue of a youthful epistemological influence is the matter of determining how this influence has shaped the subject individual's sense of personal social identity usually by no later than the end of adolescence. There may be exceptions to this, but such exceptions represent a more complex case than we are considering here.
In the study of Karl Marx, the complementarity of the sense of identity and world outlook is most dramatically underlined as we examine the way in which Marx worked within the framework of the two principal errors of historical fact which otherwise flawed his work. Marx accepted and vigorously defended, almost to the point of an obsession, the myth that English capitalist development was the prime historical model of reference and David Ricardo its most advanced proponent, yet, working within the framework of that delusion, he otherwise developed his sys tematic, internal analysis of capitalism in a way which, on all main points, entirely corresponds with the correct view of English capitalism. Marx accepted, on balance, the fraudulent myth of the Ninth of Thermidor. yet; in every case Marx absolutely rejected all of the varieties of "Leftism" which corresponded to the left-Jacobin obscenity' s traditions.
There is a crucial connection between that feature of Marx's later work and the evidence of the 1835 Aufsatz. The controlling influence in Marx's development, his evolution of his powers of judgment, was the sense of personal identity established by the end of his adolescence. The intensity of that correlation is rela tively exceptional. There are few historical figures who exhibit that same degree of ruthless intellectual integrity. However, the operation of this same principle is not otherwise exceptional in a notable historical figure, and operates in fact in the ordinary individual case of everyday life. One's view of the uni verse as a whole is in the last analysis a reflection of one' s ruling moral sense of personal social identity, the sense of what cannot be sacrificed without losing what one regards as one's essential moral identity as a person within society.
It is for such reasons that soldiers risk death in battle.
In studying the three archetypes have above, one can start from two points of to arrive at the same result. It is the combination of both points of reference to this effect which provides the essential degree of comprehension wanted. On the one side, one can consider the circumstances in which the Apollonian, Dionysian, and Promethean outlooks arise historically. On the other side, one can examine the same problem from the standpoint of the maturation of the infant, child, and adolescent. Taking both together, this is another way of exposing the mirror-image relationship between the ordering principle of world outlook and the person' s sense of moral identity.
The Promethean and Apollonian outlook are commonly distinguished from the Dionysian outlook by the fact that both define the universe as ruled by universally and comprehensively efficient and coherent universal laws. The Dionysian makes his sensual, individual self the center of the universe for knowledge, and demands "areas of liberty" for his will (and the wills of others) within which universal law ceases to be fully, coherently efficient.
The Apollonian regards universal laws as permanently fixed in all their implications.
The Promethean regards universal law as what we would properly today call "negentropic." The Promethean regards the universal law as one of selfdevelopment, and man as an efficient agency for acting lawfully to promote such self-development.
The Apollonian views the universe in terms of fixed objects of fixed qualities, and regards universal laws principally as the ordering relations among those objects. Although the Dionysian rejects the Apollonian' s comprehensive coherence for universal law, he accepts the "field-particle" notion of the ordering of phenomena otherwise distinguishing the Apollonian from Promethean view.
These distinctions in outlook are directly associated with different conceptions of the morally acceptable understanding of the human will. The Apollonian regards any deviation from a predeterm ined form of lawful behavior as error (sin) which must result in a countervailing action by the universe to correct this error (penalty). He concurs with the nominalist so far, as to define a range or error which separates tolerable error from a greater deviation, which is outlawry. The Promethean accepts no notion of toleration in the Apollonian sense, but regards freedom of the will as properly action by man consistent with the lawful principles of development of the universe.
Freedom is not violation of natural law, but is creative discovery, which enables man to alter universal law in a way prescribed by universal law. Scientific knowledge as the informed basis for chang ing the world is the paradigm for such freedom, such exercise of the will.
The Dionysian defines freedom as irrationality, as an existentialist assertion of egoistical, sensual, and analogous individual impulses in spite of natural law.
The Apollonian view is characteristic of bodies of opinion which attempt to resist both progress and degeneration, to perpetuate and perfect the natural law in its presently misdefined condition. The Promethean view is characterized by the commitment to scientific progress as essential. The Dionysian view (omnia contra omnes) is the anarchist view, the licentiousness of the immoral declasse, the criminal element. the lumpen, the individual or group which places itself into opposition to those general social interests which are contrary to its impulses.
The Dionysian view corresponds in the maturation of the individual to the infantile view, the Apollonian to the "good," obedient child and adolescent, the Promethean to the adult who must achieve moral identity in the society as a whole by contributing or extending some innovation which is of lasting value as the foundation for the future progress of society.
The three types are illustrated by the way three different persons might treat a persistently badly functioning television receiver. The Dionysian (the in fantile person) kicks the instrument. The Apollonian seeks advice from an authority. The Promethean dis covers a better instrument.
The complementarity between world outlook and moral identity is approximated: "This is what the universe as a whole must be, and therefore this is your proper identity within it." It is the way in which that sense of moral identity is transmitted to and tostered in the developing individual which is crucial, and most decisively crucial, in understanding the dominant figures of our culture. Indeed, the education of the young, taking the notion of education in its proper, broadest sense tor this purpose, is essentially the youth's search for a moral sense of adult identity. "Who" - not what - "am I going to be when I grow up?"
It is that induced sense of moral identity which the emerging new adult applies as the governing standard of judgment for those ideas and issues which he encounters.
In Marx' s case, turning again to the powerful influence of his ignorance concerning vital facts of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries which separates him, often from such great Neoplatonics as Condorcet and Hamilton among others, Marx nonetheless stands out as reaching the same world outlook as Franklin' s follower Carey on all of the important issues of the Civil War in the United States. This occurred despite the fact that Carey's perception of the eighteenth century and ot English capitalism was correct, and Marx' s flawed on those counts ot difference even though Carey was an industrial capitalist politically and Marx a socialist. This coincidence reflects the powerful integrity flowing from Marx' s Neoplatonic sense of moral identity. Given the same facts, any Neoplatonic of strong integrity must tend to generate approximately the same practical judgments.
Turning to the Illuminati and Freemasons of the eighteenth century, not only did they include strongly prohumanist (Franklin' s allies) and violently anti-humanist (the allies of Pitt, Hume, Bentham, et al,) currents in the same organizations, but this complexity is characteristic of all of the associations of that period (in particular). Commonality of association, coincidence in factional support of strong issues, and so forth, are not intrinsically reliable guides to history. Moreover, just as most adults are partly infantile in their personalities, two outlooks, the interior one always tending to the infantile-dionysian-nominalist outlook, usually operate, in personalities. Hence, an individual may transmit one outlook at one time, and another at another.


We can study the intellectual collapse of the old social-democratic pro-Marxian and Communist organizations ot the OECD countries from various standpoints of initial reterence. It is necessary to recognize that in general these organizations were destroyed by included means of externally applied containment and subverson. However, this account, while indispensable to reaching the whole truth of the matter, leaves certain most crucial facts unnoticed. The transformation of the characteristic, internal world outlook of these organizations is equivalent to a transformation of the genetic specificity of an organism - and not only in the heuristic sense. We must inquire what were the epistemological weaknesses, the weakness or lack of an active generating principle, which made such a genetic transtormation possible?
The recent paper of Dr. Richard Pollak * and the companion paper by Dr. Ned Rosinsky* identify the important discoveries occurring in biology concerning the process of mutation, which bear directly on this. It is argued that the origin of mutation is not in the "string of beads" aspect of the genetic material, but that these genetic materials provide an essential part of the conservative forces, so to speak, processes which regulate the stability of an evolved species or variety. The fact, as reported by Pollak, that special changes in the thermodynamics of the total environment have been rigorously proven as causing permanent, heritable mutations in variety, shows for biology the operation of the same principles previously proven to rule for societies and the directed, negentropic evolution of the biosphere as a whole.

* Dr. Richard Pollak,"Evolution - Beyond Darwin and Mendel," and Dr. Ned Rosinsky. "Drosophila Embryology -.The Dynamics of Evolution," in Fusion Energy Foundation Newsletter. Vol. II, No. 4 may 1977).pp.42-53.54-59.

To the uncritical observer, such demonstrations may appear to be a simple resurrection of the Lamarckian notion of determined inheritance. More immediately, the echoes of the "Lysenko controversy" are heard. Some comment on this is much in order, to clear the way for what must be considered in respect to the myth of "idealism" versus "materialism" as a contributing element in the internal decay of socialist organizations of the OECD countries.
First, in conditional defense of Lamarck and Lysenko.
Lamarckian views originally developed as a by-product of the Neoplatonic humanist ferment persisting strongly in eighteenth century science. Working from the principle Of Ibn Sina, the principle which was the guiding conception of all the achievements of the European Renaissance and Enlightenment, the fact that the realization, of human creative discoveries in the form of more powerful scientific knowledge represented man' s mastery of the laws of the universe signified that the Idea of Progress must be the fundamental lawful principle underlying all categories ot phenomena. If one considers the problem of physics as posited by Leibniz' s Monadology, and considers the work of Lagrange from this standpoint, the basis for Lamarck' s attempted application of the humanist principle of evolution is immediately grasped.
Although Descartes set out to establish the principle of the relativistic continuum for physics, as is not to be doubted when his work on physics is compared with his definition of perfection, until the work of Riemann and the important complementary work of Cantor - a span of two centuries of physical science - the problem of formally conceptualizlng a negentropic principle within the domain of physics as such remained essentially unsolved. Hence, Lagrange and others, although working under strong, Franklin-shaped humanist influences within the group of the Ecole Polytechnique, failed to get beyond a mechanist reductionist conception of the formalities of physical science as such. Hence, Lamarck, proceeding from an essentially negentropic conception of evolution on the one side, developed his argument in reductionist terms of explication. He attempted to define a negentropic principle in evolution in mechanistic, entropic terms of practical reference.
Therefore, Lamarck's work has great epistemological interest in the study of biological science, but no direct applicability in the form it was advanced.
From the more recent material assessed by Pollak, we have fresh insight into the kind of work done by Michurin and Lysenko. They had clearly struck upon experimental evidence of the type which has been more rigorously conducted since that time. Until the relevant files of the appropriate Soviet agencies are researched afresh from the standpoint outlined by Pollak, we shall not have an adequate appreciation of the background to Lysenko's thesis. However, as with the case of Lamarck himself, the official version of the Lysenko thesis skidded over the crucial point, thus contributing to the discrediting of valuable research by blind zeal in placing a theory where an incompletely developed hypothesis, replete with question marks, should have been offered.
This aspect of the Lysenko problem is immediately representative of the kinds of devastating blunders to which any simple counterposition of "idealism" and "materialism" must lead. Reciprocally, this connection to biological science underscores the "genetic problem" to be considered in respect to the decay of socialist organizations.
Although Marx himself was deluded by falsified facts concerning English capitalist development, his guiding method otherwise was the Neoplatonic humanist outlook and sense of personal moral identity. It was this active, "genetic" feature of Marx's "character" which not only preserved but developed his elaborated outlook throughout his life. If the predicates of that principle, i.e., Marx' s specific beliefs, are taken without regard to the generative principle (Neoplatonic humanism) which determined their existence, then we have what might be termed "Marxism", in the perjorative sense. Any set of beliefs, even those determined by a generative principle, if taken as specific doctrines, and so forth, represent not a world outlook but a mechanistic structure thus intrinsically subject to entropy.
This point is corroborated by comparing the leading "orthodox Marxist-Leninist" currents in the leadership of the parties of the CMEA countries with the rampaging "Eurocommunism" of the Communist parties of the OECD countries. The difference is not that the Soviet and other "hard-liners" cling to the official doctrine of "Marxism-Leninism." This could not be the case, since the principal published texts on "principles of Marxism-Leninism" and on the topics of "historical and dialectical materialism" include awful rubbish. Rather, the CMEA countries are committed to the principles of Neoplatonic humanist practice, to the notion of a republic committed by intrinsic character to the application of basic scientific progress to technological progress of expanding productive forces, and to the development of the general education and associated culture of the population on the basis of that program.
The characteristic of socialist thought in the CMEA countries centers around the economic plan. What most conspicuously distinguishes the socialist, Neoplatonic thrust in those countries' leading tendencies is the reciprocal connection between the forced effort for basic scientific development and the hegemony of the thermonuclear war-winning strategic posture. Machiavelli, Benjamin Franklin, Hamilton, and Condorcet would tend to thoroughly understand the Soviet currents, in these terms of reference.
The problem in the CMEA countries is that on the one side the "official doctrine" is a glossed version of "Marxism-Leninism" which, taken by itself, is significantly rubbish. However, the Neoplatonic, predominantly "hard-line" currents in the CMEA countries' parties' leadership strata interpret that doctrine from the standpoint of a Neoplatonic humanist generating principle.
In contrast, in the OECD countries, in which the majority of Communist parties' leaderships are essentially heirs of Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau rather than of Hegel and Marx, the opposite generating principle, the nominalist generating principle, has operated. Hence, we have the pattern of a long period of moral and intellectual decay, previously contained within the terms of reference of the accredited doctrine, which, at a threshold-value point, erupts in the forms of Merleau-Ponty or the present Eurocommunist tendency.
The "hard-liners" of the CMEA countries are organically Marxist. Although generally more primitively developed intellectually than Marx more himself, they independently replicate the same quality of generating world outlook represented by asserting the Marx, and react to the obsessive errors of their official doctrines with the same sort of corrective tendencies for practice shown more conspicuously in the work of Marx himself.
At the same time, as is the case for the eighteenth century factional forces among the Freemasons and Illuminati, the Gironde and the Jacobins, the Communist parties are not morally homogenous either within or outside the CMEA countries. There are those in the highest circles of the CPSU who, like Georgii Arbatov, represent the most degraded, nominalist outlooks, and who, at best estimate, are not socialists in fact but merely Soviet patriots - There are organic socialists within the Communist parties of the OECD countries, despite the hegemonies of Carrillo, Marchais, Berlinguer, and so forth.
This sort of evidence absolutely does not warrant a preference for the nominalist historiographical doctrine of "factors." The chaotic picture which first emerges from looking at the phenomena in terms of carried-forward criteria merely demonstrates that the wrong criteria. the wrong method have been applied to the investigation. What has been lacking is the understanding that the relevant problems of historiography are methodologically identical with the problem of the transfinite as successively developed by Riemann and Cantor. The world has been viewed from the wrong standpoint of reference and by the wrong method.
Marx himself implicitly refuted the idealism-versus-materialism nonsense in its entirety in his famous "Theses on Feuerbach." In fact, those "Theses" are not only a direct restatement of the Neoplatonic humanist view in the most basic terms of reference, but, excepting Riemann' s self-conscious efforts to redefine physics entirely from the standpoint of negentropy as the unique universal principle, Marx's theses represent an unmatched statement of the case for Neoplatonic humanism until our own, more advanced accomplishments in this, connection. Indeed, it was this writer' s own recognition, beginning approximately 1952, that the standpoints of Riemann-Cantor and Marx must be unified to reach a comprehensive solution to the problem, which ultimately led directly to the qualitative supercession of the work of both Riemann-Cantor and Marx.
The case of Hegel suffices to prove the absurdity of the effort to define "idealism" and "materialism" as distinct epistemological currents. Nothing is grossly absurd, more profoundly incompetent, than to propose that Marx overthrew Hegel by materialist point of view for the dialectical method.
The flaw in Hegel which Marx corrected was in fact Hegel' s refusal to break with the classical materialist point of view in respect to physics. Hegel, elaborating the Neoplatonic humanist outlook comprehensively for the intellectual process of human development, accepted the physics of Lagrange as converging upon perfect knowledge of perfected universal physical laws. Hegel was concerned to follow the path of Heraclitus in attacking the problem of showing that the physical universe was created dialectically, but at the same time he regarded Lagrange' s physics as reflecting - at least epistemologically - the perfected state of that universe. Hence, Hegel denied the efficiency of human creative thought in respect to further evolutions of the lawful state of nature. Hence, for Hegel. Lagrange' s physics became his Seelensack ; Lagrangian epistemology represented an impenetrable sack which contained (for Hegel) the freedom (creative powers) of the human mind.
In the second of Marx's "Theses," this Hegelian Seelensack was directly ripped asunder. Hegel' s delusion concerning the Lagrangian determinatiOn of physical necessity was overthrown as "a purely scholastic question."
Hegel' s problem was replicated in principle, although. differently, by Feuerbach, Feuerbach inverted. so to speak, the classical materialist particle, field relationship, making the "field" the primary existence. Hence, his denunciation of the protofascist reactionaries, Bacon, Locke, and Hobbes, on this account. However, Feuerbach defined the subject,- the field, as primary with respect .to the predicated phenomenal order of nature as described by the mechanists. Hence, Feuerbach's slogan, "backwards I agree with the materialists, but not forwards." So far, contrary to Engels, Feuerbach was correct. However, as Marx emphasizes correctly in the first of the "Theses On Feuerbach," Feuerbach's refusal to give up the fixed existence of the determinate (not self-evident) particle in the Spinozan field caused Feuerbach to reach judgments contrary to Feuerbach's own conscious intention. By accepting the self-evident particle as a reflection of the principles of the Cartesian-Spinozan "field," Feuerbach prohibited practical-revolutionary activity. Feuerbach posited, with Descartes and Spinoza, the principle of freedom (creative scientific progress), but accepting the phenomena of the self-evident particle, Feuerbach prohibited the efficient exercise of freedom in respect to materialized practice.
In sum, the flaws in Hegel and Feuerbach were precisely that they refused to break entirely with classical materialism. They rejected the epistemological generating principle of classical materialism, but they aborted this attack upon Aristotelianism and nominalism combined by making the phenomenology of the nominalists a kind of Seelensack which they declined to rip asunder. Marx freed dialectics of "idealism" by breaking entirely with the doctrines of classical "materialism." The same point is efficiently made with respect to Immanuel Kant. Kant was essentially a member of the anti-Newtonian faction of Leibniz. He was essentially in the same anti-British faction as Benjamin Franklin, in that he wrote his most famous work, The Critique of Pure Reason, as a conscious effort to destroy once and forever the enemy doctrines of nominalism (indifferentism) as represented by the foul British political-intelligence operative, David Hume. The case of Herder and of Marx's teacher Wyttenbach are relevant. The preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason is one of the most penetrating and devastating attacks on today' s British ideology ever composed.
Kant' s problem was of the same genre as Hegel' s entirely and Feuerbach's. Although Kant was fundamentally opposed to such conscious enemies of humanity as Bacon, Newton, Locke, Hobbes, and Hume, his opposition was largely delimited to the domain of abstract epistemology, and otherwise to the principle of basic scientific progress as the proper governing practical principle of progress for society. Three aspects of Kant' s work are the proper foci of criticism.
The first criticism to be made of Kant is that made by Hegel. Kant was politically impotent; he refused to acknowledge an efficient, practical connection between freedom and understanding : hence, the antinomies.
The second and third criticisms to be made of Kant' s work are his varied deferences to Rousseau and Lagrange.
Like many credulous leading thinkers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Kant was ignorant of the fact that Swiss bankers' political agent Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the "eeft-anarchist" side of Necker, was essentially rewarmed Bacon, Locke, and Hobbes. Kant failed, like many others, to recognize that Rousseau was not only reactionary with respect to his role as a political agent of monetarist-feudalist reaction, but that Rousseau' s political role was everywhere represented in the bestiality of his thought.
Because Rousseau' s empiricist, implicitly proto-fascist conception of the field-particle relationship corresponded to the mechanistic side of the Lagrangian schema, Rousseau was cheerfully mistaken tO be a well-meaning "egalitarian" in respect of the "particles" of which society is composed. The "muckraking"' aspect of Rousseau was accepted as such, and by accepting this aspect of the vile Rousseau, the fascist side of Rousseau' s outlook was regarded as something to be tolerated for "friendly criticisms and corrections."
It was just this stupidity respecting the Necker-linked Rousseau doctrines which prompted the Necker-linked Maximilien Robespierre to cheerfully preside over the Danton-Marat destruction of everything which Robespierre himselfotherwise esteemed himself to prize.
This influence shows up in Kant's quasi-anarchism. By accepting in part Rousseau' s ostensible parallels to the Lagrangian model of the universe, Kant reverted to the classical Aristotelian or scholastic conception of the "categorical imperative." Despite the fraudulent neo-Kantians, such as Lange, Bernstein, et al., Kant was no anarchist, no Rousseauvian, no neo-Kantian. His degenerate side was Aristotelian; his notion of democracy was in effect classically scholastic; he accepted absolutely the notion of efficient and comprehensive universal law, and also the absoluteness of the principle of freedom. On this account. he is usefully compared for study with the most advanced Jesuits.
It was for such reasons that Hegel justly denounced the implications of the kantsche Seelensack as a separation of freedom and understanding which must lead directly to dangerous mental pathologies, poisonous fantasies.
The key to Rousseau is the "noble savage," as we shall treat the implications of that below.
In the official Soviet and parallel efforts to make a distinction between "idealism" and "materialism" several profound incompetencies are most conspicuously involved.
First, what the Soviets properly mean by their formal definition of idealism, is nominalism. However, as the productions of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism illustrate, they are ignorant of the essential characteristics of nominalism. They thus put themselves in the absurd position of regarding the most hideous nominalists as "historically progressive materialists," and deprecating with even greater absurdity some of Marx's greatest direct predecessors as flawed, relative to the nominalists, by "reactionary" tendencies toward "idealism."
Nominalism, by placing the heteronomic will as superior to the laws of the universe, converges on the ultimately fascist doctrine of the "social contract," the doctrines of the raving pro-stuart reactionary, John Locke, and the morally imbecilic apologist for fascist dictatorship, Hobbes. Whatever the heteronomic wills of ruling forces compact to make the law of human behavior (social-contract versions of positive law) is superior to the laws of nature. That is pure idealism, which Soviet sources grudgingly concede to be the case to the extent that they speak of metaphysical materialism.
What those Sovi'et sources (and related sources) obsessively refuse to get through their stubborn heads is that since man is a part and product of the universe the power of the mind to create scientific knowledge through which societies increase their power over the universe and its laws, is itself the one and only fundamental principle of all human knowledge. the only fundamental, empirical basis for man' s knowledge of the unique, coherent, and comprehensively efficient actuallaws of the universe as a whole.
They call themselves Marxists, but on this issue they are often crude, pre-Feuerbachians. Whereas Marx himself, as in the "Theses On Feuerbach" in the "Feuerbach" section of The German Ideology, makes the revolutionary aspect of scientifically driven progress in social practice the unique and only source of fundamental human knowledge, the Soviets revert to the worst errors of Kant - yes precisely the errors of Kant, which is why they are unable to competently criticize Kant - in dividing the universe into Lagrangian nature plus man. The Soviet authors of the idealism-versus-materialism theses are therefore themselves raving idealists in fact. Hence, their softness toward reactionary nominalism, on grounds that it is dubbed relatively the "progressive movement" of materialism. The Soviet authors involved are not nominalists generally, although Georgii Arbatov himself is nothing but a raving, reactionary nominalist; they are Aristotelians in the tradition of Kantian critical philosophy.
Although Marx himself accepted the literary is categories of "idealist" and "materialist" his writings do not reflect the slightest correspondence with the predominant Soviet and related usages of those terms otherwise. The first and second of the "Theses On Feuerbach," the "Feuerbach" section of The German Ideology, and the treatment of Freedom and Necessity in the final section of Volume III of Capital are a consistent development of the same Neo-platonic humanist conception, a drive differently reflected to the same ultimate effect in the work of Riemann.
Friedrich Engels himself is a less clear-cut case. Apart from the fact that Marx partially shared with many other German republicans of his generation the myth of English "llberalism," it was Engels's misguided insistence on the continuing preeminence of British technological progress in capitalist development which swayed Marx significantly to favor the delusion involved. Engels was similarly at fault respecting Marx' s disoriented perception of the nature and implications of nineteenth century trends in the physical sciences. Engels's unfortunate "Ludwig Feuerbach," and a related comparison of Marx's "Feuerbach" section of The German Ideology with Engels' s fragmentary effort at writing that same section are most pertinent. Although Engels is not the author of the pathetic "dialectical materialism" circulated by Soviet sources, it must be admitted that he opened the door through which others moved into such directions.
If the Soviet scholars wished to show a consistent line of development of the kind. of "materialism" represented by the cited writings of Marx, they would be obliged to begin with the greatest thinker of the Arab Renaissance, Ibn Sina. It was the direct influence of Ibn Sina' s conception of the creative powers of the human mind as necessarily a reflection of the fundamental law' of the universe which directly engineered the entirety of the humanist currents of the European Renaissance. They would include Roger Bacon, Dante Alighieri, Ficino, Pico, Erasmus, Gresham, Bodin, Gilbert, Raleigh, Bruno, Colbert, Milton, Quesnay, Franklin, Turgot, Condorcet, Liebniz (sic), Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel as a coherent line of epistemological development leading directly into Beethoven and Marx. They would ridicule any effort to describe any figure in that coherent epistemological progression as an "idealist."
The fundamental epistemological issues of the history of human thought are, as we have emphasized above. the question whether universal natural law comprehensively efficient, and, if so, is that universal law negentropic or entropic. From that standpoint, the only historically meaningful use of the term "idealism" is the nominalist current which places the heteronomic will of man acting without regard to universal naturallaw above natural law in efficiency for social practice. Nominalism, indifferentism, and monetarism are the same thing. and represent the only coherent current Of thought which can be meaning fully described as " idealist."


Throughout much of Soviet historical writings, continuing the sentimental tradition of the Prussian social-democratic romantic Franz Mehring, one reads interminably of the "heroic struggles of the people." This populist crap, this seepage of sewage from the traditions of Rousseau and Marat, has done more to destroy the soci'alist movement from within than any other cause.
What was "Operation Barbarossa" but a struggle of the German People to relieve the oppressive material conditions of life in the Third Reich by looting foreign countries? What were the subhuman wretches of Wallenstein's horde but "great masses of the people" seeking to alleviate the oppressions of hunger by preying upon the very fabric of society like a plague of cannibalistic locusts? What were the fascist mobs of Paris, ranged behind British-agent demagogues Danton and Marat, but the same degraded, reactionary "people"? It is past time to extirpate this degrading, sentimental crap once and forever from the pages of historiography.
The essence of human existence, as human, is the development and realization of the creative powers of the mind as the instrument for advanci'ng the human condition through increasing man's power over nature. How, in the entire sweep of human existence, has progress been attained except through the production and realization of social surplus product? It is the application of new conceptions to social, surplus product, the development of the productive powers of man over nature, upon which everything depends. Anything contrary to that is bestial crap, which has nothing to do with all those qualities we rightly esteem as human.
Since the beginning of the Crusades in Europe, all European culture has been divided between two principal factions. On the one side were the intellectual heirs of Ibn Sina, the Neoplatonic humanists. On the other side were the fascists - the nominalists, the monetarists, often with the Aristotelians as allies against the human race.
The humanists proceeded axiomatically from the standpoint of progress. Science was a political cause - until scientists were later induced to forget, for a while, what science is in fact. The development of the powers of mind to create scientific knowledge, knowledge which in turn informed the general and individual will for social practice, was always the center of humanism. The use of science to develop the productive forces, to consciously increase man' s power over nature as the mediating precondition for the education and cultural development of man in general, was the essence of this struggle.
To this the scholastic reactionaries said "No'! Man was perfected In the Garden of Eden, and can go no higher. Man has merely fallen from Grace, and must work his way back to that already perfected condition he has lost through ignorance and sin."
The fascists, the nominalists, presented a different argument against humanism. They said : "No! Man is intrinsically evil and violent against man. Perfection is an impossibility - There never was and never can be an efficient rule of social practice by natural law. Man can deliver himself from the consequences of his intrinsic evil only by social contracts and governments to enforce such social-contract forms of the simply "positive law."
Kant is thus clearly a humanist. His denunciation of heteronomy in his Critique of Practical Reason locates the evil in actual man entirely in his misconception of himself as a Rousseauvian or Lockean individual. Progress is necessary; it is the single imperative which is the expression of freedom through creative scientific discovery which masters the universe with increasing power for social practice. Kant was powerful against the fascists - Locke, Hobbes, and Hume, but impotent before the task of making the principle of freedom efficient.
In essentials, the struggle between humanism and the wellspring of fascism (nominalism) was a struggle for and against the Idea of Progress. This counterposition of policy represented the conscious, self-conscious distinction between the humanists and the nominalists. The humanists proceeded both in policy and in moral sense of personal identity from the necessity for progress in man's productive powers over nature, and the conception of rigorous scientific knowledge as the indisp ensable mediation of that progress. The bestialists rejected above all the creative powers of mind to master the actual, comprehensively efficient laws of the universe for progress. The "noble savage" and similar forms of "cultural relativistic" advocacy of bestialism (man as like a beast, with fixed behavioral tendencies like a lower beast) Were the point at issue.
The cases of Bacon, Locke, and Newton as conscious political reactionaries are most relevant.
At the close of the Elizabethan period, the most conspicuous leader of the humanist faction in England was Sir Walter Raleigh. With the accession of James Stuart, Raleigh was imprisoned on fraudulent charges and subsequently beheaded as the sealing of James I' s treachery against England in cahoots with the Hapsburg and allied financier forces. The Queen Mother of France has an interesting connection in this matter.
Francis Bacon, quondam Stuart Chancellor of the Exchequer and. generally an arrant scoundrel and embezzler, was a key figure inthe antihumanist cabal and in James I' s treasonous betrayal of England to its enemies. No one who has studied Bacon's Novum Organum from the standpoint of knowing the principal extant scientific and related writings of Giordano Bruno or the English humanists could imagine that there was anything even slightly progressive for science in Bacon's writings. The image of Bacon as a leader in the progress of scientific thought is pure hoax. Exactly the contrary. Bacon' s argument is against the previously established scientific progress, in favor of the nominalist-monetarist forces by which this filthy traitor was paid.
John Locke is a contemptible wretch fully in the worst aspects of the tradition of Francis Bacon. His writings, like those of the despicable Hobbes, are scientifically noteworthy solely for their clinical interest. They state the case for heteronomy with such exceptional thoroughness that they represent not only the principal forerunners of modern fascism, but are the exemplary references on this subject. Locke, like Hobbes, was a political agent for not only the Stuarts, but for those French and Amsterdam agents for whom the Stuarts were essentially paid agents, like Locke Leibniz himself. Both were imbued with the deepest hatred of humanism, notably of Milton, and of everything which hinted at republicanism.
The Scottish lowlands aristocracy has proven since the middle of the sixteenth century one of the principal festering places for every evil which has squatted upon England. This role of the Scottish aristocracy has not been accidental. Essentially, at a time when England under humanist leadership was arising from the bestiality of medievalism into urbanized industrial development, those damned Scottish lords and their brutish underling landlords represented the very decayed bowels ofpast British history. A contained Scottish highlands, still living in the middle of the preceding millenium, was complementary to the lowland self living under the most hideous landlord rule.
Intrinsically backward to the point of bestiality, perennially bankrupt, and wanting the rudiments of what passed for Christian morality in more advanced centers of Europe, these miserable Scottish nobles Anglo-American were a ready market for any foreign agency which jingled the requisite amount of hard coinage under their unwiped noses. Their loyalties were as labile as they were mercenary in essence. Their attitudes toward progress would make Adolf Hitler appear a art and the physical passionate humanist by comparison.
All six of the Stuart monarchs of England (if one counts Mary) exhibited that national trait of the Scottish nobility in the extreme. All of them were conscious and paid traitors to the nations whose throne they occupied, and their immediate retinues were characteristically the paid sycophants of degraded mercenaries.
The formation of the ROyal Society in England under the Stuarts had a double purpose. Its overt function was to coopt and thus contain scientific progress along lines agreeable - or least disagreeable - to the conscious lying included - to discredit Stuarts and their employers. At the same time, the Royal Society was the nominalist's "CIA" of its time, the center of a vast network of agents and covert operations devoted to destroying the humanist influence and subverting and crushing the networks associations of humanists around art, science, and politics.
Colbert, himself a masterof political-intelligence networks, and Leibniz organized humanist counter-networks against the circles centered around Locke and Newton, networks penetrating England and seeking connections in the English plantations in America.
Benjamin Franklin was the principal connection for the overlapping networks of Colbertistes and heirs in America.
Given the abysmal ignorance prevailing in universities and university-educated circles generally today, it first appears incredible to tody's so-called educated individual that the two factions arrayed against one another could have been so fully conscious on so many fronts of combat. For example, the Royal Society in London, informed of the work of Sebastian Bach in Leipzig, decided that Bach's tempered system was a cultural influence for humanism, and launched a covert operation, focused on Leipzig, aiming to isolate and discredit Bach. Montesquieu was a paid agent of British circles and wrote his work under the sponsorship of British circles who knew the political benefits of Montesquieu' s frauds. The operation focused against Wilhelm Furtwangler by American political-intelligence forces during the postwar period was scarcely without precedent. The cultivation of the cult of the twelve-tone scale, launched through Anglo-American intelligence services during the 1920s, and the more recent cultivation of "Rock," represent a conscious continuation of anti-humanist principles, which recognize the danger to their political hegemony in humanist impulses within art and the physical sciences.
Scottish aristocratic scion David Hume, agent of the British foreign office who spent approximately ten years in France building up networks to subvert the humanist faction of Colbertistes, wrote his so-called philosophical works as a conscious operation against humanism. Similarly, Jeremy Bentham was nothing but a leading political intelligence operative and coordinator of covert "wetwork" operations for the British East India Company, as was his accomplice, James Mill. Adam Smith was not an economist but another one of the same tribe, writing a hoax intended - with aid of massive, consciouslying included - to discredit both the Colbertistes and the influence of the American Revolution.
In general, during the eighteenth century, the humanists and the London-led bestialists each recognized what was humanist and what was anrihumanist in art, science, and philosophy, and in political economy. They knew from experience how humanism in art directly connected to humanism in science and political economy, and vice versa. There was no significant aspect of cultural influences in any part of the accessible world which the London-based bestialists did not undertake to subvert and crush by any and every means available.
Granted, nominalism was what Scottish aristocrat' s mercenary morality believed. It believed in Locke. Hobbes, and Hume. It believed in the cause of bestialism, as that cause which best served the interests of the banks of London, Amsterdam, its paymasters in and Geneva. Nonetheless, believing in nominalism with a mercenary sort of passion or not, they fought to spread nominalist, antiprogress conceptions against humanist conceptions by every and any means, in every accessible avenue of social life.
In strategy, the bestialists had two, complementary methods for fighting the humanists forcibly. In the ordinary circumstances, an assassination here and there, a deployment of regular forces, buying corruptible persons and groupings to crush a humanist project, were the axiomatically deployed means of London, Amsterdam, Geneva and their Guelph-centered allies. When these ordinary means proved inadequate by themselves, London and its allies resorted to judo. " Judo" meant, in general, provocation. Provoked social crises, provoked and fostered wars in which the opposition would bleed itself to a suitable degree of weakness and popular discredit, and, always, the use of "left" demagogues to whip up "the people."
The British aristocracy, whose public school and university life emphasized Latin and sodomy with a bit of Greek, resorted repeatedly to the lesson of the fall of the Roman republic. The lumpen urban mobs and jacqueries were mobilized as a battering ram of irrationality and havoc. The classic case was Pitt and Bentham's use of their agents Danton and Marat to destroy the French Revolution' s humanist faction. British agents used the same methods in their subversion of the United States. British agent Aaron Burr (of the Bank of Manhattan) established the power of the Democratic Party by buying up immigrant votes. The lumpen, the immoral declasse, and the politically backward rural strata were the principal stock-in trade of the British foreign office for years.
The demagogue populists. the "friends of the people," from the raving fascist, British agent Marat, from the Tories' agents of the American Revolution " Thus, once man rises out of onwards, have been the ultimate political means by enabled which a relatively tiny handful of bestialist scoundrels have ruled and degraded great nations. Mussolini's fascism, the Nazi variety, and other cases have been nothing but a twentieth century outgrowth of left-Jacobinism and anarchism into century variety.
It is this filth which simpering, by socialist writers invoke with their adulation of the "voice of the people." Such populism has nothing in common with the outlook of Karl Marx.
Both Aristotelian and Neoplatonic Christian theology have correctly and consistently recognized that the evil individual man is identical with the sort of materialism which the nominalists profess. In terms of analysis, Marx' s views on this subject differ not at all from classical Christian theology. The connection among these converging views on the subject is crucial to understanding the problem.
As soon as man begins to produce his means of existence, rather than living like a lower food-gathering beast, he confronts himself with a fundamental problem which thereafter determines the necessity of human existence. As man makes even the slightest changes in his mode of existence along lines we today generically describe as productive technology, he gains in power over nature to the effect of increasing the number of useful calories per capita throughput of his mode of production and consumption. However, in so doing, he has introduced a necessary condition for his existence which is not to be found in nature without man' s activity to that effect. This new condition, at each qualitative step in technological progress, has the following driving contradiction. By raising himself above what the ingenuous term "natural conditions," man exploits those "natural conditions," such that aspects of nature, in "original" or man-altered condition, become what we term primary resources. Since man is existing at a higher level of per capita energy throughput than is provided for him in "the natural condition of nature," those aspects of his environment which he regards as primary resources become relatively finite. This circumstance is such by definition that even by constricting or reducing his population - if that were possible - he would be exhausting the possibilities for continued human existence in that prevailing mode of technology. Man solves this problem only through creative discoveries which, as realized, raise the negentropy of his mode of existence to a still higher level above that for beast-man in "natural nature." Thus, once man rises out of a beast-like condition, the capacity which enabled that, his potential for realizing creative scientific discoveries, becomes the driving necessity of human existence.
This necessary progress is realized by the concerted action of the minds of society to initiate new equivalents of basic scientific discoveries and to transmit those discoveries, as informed will for social practice, to the mode of production and related aspects of culture. This is accomplished through transforming a social-surplus fraction of the total productive forces available into the means for realizing innovations for practice.
That being the case, if men in any society separate themselves in notions of self-interest from the advancement of their society as a whole, then to such views progress is impossible. The cooperative fostering and realization of innovations, the allocation of a social surplus to such purposes, becomes impossible. Yet, having rejected the instruments and institutions of continued human development, such persons have not escaped the rigorous necessity. The depletion of a prevailing mode of culture closes in upon the society, either objectively or by virtue of the inability of society in that form of organization to realize otherwise existing potentialities. Under such real or apparent circumstances, man becomes a cannibalistic beast, and, in too many historical cases, a cannibal in fact.
The correlatives of the opposing views, the social versus the heteronomic individual, are historically $he opposition of the Logos to the sensual. Social man locates his "soul," his personality in his membership in his.society as a whole. He is in a state of atonement with the society as a whole. He acts for his society, realizes the rights afforded to his person by that society, and identifies himself morally as a person acting for his society as a whole. "My society has need of what I do for it, therefore my society meets its needs to fulfill my needs to maintain myself in that quality of function." The heteronomic man, the anarchist - the evil one - says, on the contrary, "Reality is my eating, my pleasure in sex, the gratification of my individual impulses as psychological needs. Nothing else is real to me."
The dull-witted fellow would therefore say that the first individual is an "idealist" and the second a "materialist." However, that dichotomy makes no sense except to the dull-witted. It is nothing but the mastery of the material conditions of life which is the Immediate, mediating essential process on whose behalf the first outlook has developed. It reflects the fact that society can survive only by cooperative creative efforts to master natural law in practice. The heteronome denies that the materi al object of gratification is determined by natural law. In fact, it is the evil individual, the "atheistic-materialist" individual, the ignorant, savage frontiersman, who is the "idealist." It is he who places his arbitrary whims above natural law.
These distinctions in outlook are not merely ideas. The first outlook is essential to practical human survival. The second, if dominant, leads toward the extinction of societies. Hence, the difference between the two points of view is not a mootable difference of philosophical opinion. The former must be enhanced and the influence of the latter suppressed.
On this point Marx was emphatic. The working class, in its ordinary, individualized, heteronomic condition is a mere class-in-itself. an object-class, a class of persons self-defined as mere bestialized objects. A class in tsuch a condition is intellectually and morally incapable of adopting or even conceiving a positive historic purpose for itself for society in general. It is Only the transformation of the pathetic " molecules" of the class-in-itself into a class-for-itself which creates thus in the working class so constituted a unique historic capability for defining a programmatic self- Interest in actual correspondence both with its own objective interests as a class and the general interests of society as a whole. It must be a class whose members have adopted the world outlook represented by Marx in the concluding paragraph of his 1835 Aufsatz.
The conscious self-interest of a working class as a class-for-itself is a program forfostering basic scientific research and the realization of the derived technologies through the use of social surplus to effect the simultaneous expansion and technological advancement of industry and agriculture. The continuing result of such a realized program is a continuing increase in the productive powers of labor, an increased technological power over nature which is uniquely the material basis for continuous advances in the culture of the members of the class and the class as a whole.
In other words. the basis for defining the conscious self-interests of the working class as a class-for-itself is exemplified by those economic plans of socialist countries which emphasize basic scientific progress, high rates of technologically advanced productive capital formation in industry and agriculture, and a matching advance in the education and material-cultural conditions of life of the population in general. No other sort of ideas are tolerable for identification as socialist ideas.
Idiot-socialists nonetheless conceive of socialism as "redistribution of existing wealth," and of placing themselves near the head of every procession of enraged jacqueries dedicated to looting the "more prosperous." Oh, the idiot-socialists profess themselves to be so very, very shrewd. "You see," they explain, "once we are inside the social ferment, we shall be able to spread socialist ideas." Hence, they join and incite a potentially fascist ferment in the hope that by becoming influential members in good standing in such sewage, they will lead these forces to socialism. Program? "'No, that would only alienate the masses at this stage."
How bathetic! How utterly contemptible! What evil folly! It is precisely that evil rot which destroyed the old socialist organizations.


Since the fight between the bestial Guelph faction and the humanist Hohenstaufen faction, the history of European civilization - and now of the entire world - has been a continuous fight between the forces of bestialism (the Guelph faction and its heirs) and of humanism. The emergence of scientific socialism is but an included aspect of that overall and continuing struggle.
In point of fact, respecting capitalism itself, excepting the United States up to 1829 and for a brief period following the Lincoln administration, there has never been a capitalist republic established more than evanescently in any part of the world. So far, except in the socialist countries, the Guelph faction has predominated.
The humanist faction is not intrinsically either capitalist or socialist. The sixteenth through early nineteenth century humanists, the republicans, adopted capitalist political forms not to establish capitalism, but as the mediation of technological progress, itself the expression and mediation of the real object of humanism : a society in which man was perpetually self-perfecting. Humanism has always meant, whether in a capitalist or socialist context, the fostering of basic scientific discovery through technological development, which in turn provides, the more advanced standpoint in conditions of life and culture for a further advance.
In an historic perspective socialism is necessary. The fact that capitalist political forms establish heteronomy in the ownership of the means of production and distribution means providing a foothold for the evil consequences of heteronomy in the most vital aspect of social life. This arrangement also alienates the productive powers of labor from the instruments through which labor fulfills its historic purpose. Hence, socialism is ultimately a crucial historic question, but is not in itself the most fundamental question. Humanism is.
In the first emergence of the struggle for humanist republics, centering our attention for this purpose upon the sixteenth century in Florence and England and on the case of Erasmus himself, the definition of a republic meant a state committed to humanist principles, rather than the notions of democratic republican political forms as such. The state must be dedicated to the historic self-interests of the entire nation from the standpoint of technological, urban-centered progress and the education of its people. If the state was headed by a prince. this in itself might not be a defect in the republican form, on the condition that the prince himself was a self-consciously defined agent of the humanist principles of the state. Hence, Sir Thomas More' s relationship to Henry VIII, and Thomas Gresham and Walter Raleigh' s relationship to Queen Elizabeth. Hence. Niccolo Machiavelli' s The Prince. Hence, Jean Bodin and the doctrine of the politiques. Hence, Colbert. Hence, the policies of Franklin's French Colbertiste allies toward the Bourbon monarchy.
The English Commonwealth, shortening the reign and height of the traitorous incumbent on the throne, effected the first important break with the notions of the monarchical republic. The influence of John Milton and other Commonwealth republicans on the settlers of the future United States, notably including Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, represented the circumstances in which the modern meaning of the term republic was first defined.
The population of the future United States was the most literate and cultured in the world. It had its loutish frontiersmen, but contrary to the Jacksonian bucolic myths, Jacksonian lies, the population of the American urban centers was at a qualitatively higher level of cUlture than any area of Europe. Under the leadership of one of the greatest minds in modern history, Benjamin Franklin, the potentialities of this, the world's most cultured population, a population steeped in republican humanist ideas from the Commonwealth experience, were hewn into the greatest force for political humanism the world had seen. It was not accomplished in an instant. Franklin was occupied for almost a century in creating and developing almost piece-by-piece, the political machine which, in 1789, finally launched the approximation of that form of humanist republic which Franklin had devoted his life to building.
Who and what was Benjamin Franklin? What was Franklin doing in Italy, at Gottingen, in London, in Paris? Franklin was a scientist, who contributed significantly to the mastery of electricity, and who played a major part. in Italy, Germany, France, and England, in organizing for the mastery of this field in particular. Franklin, the international organizer of scientific work, was also the world' s greatest political figure of that period. He deepened the unity of the networks of humanists in England. where he selected his principal heir and assistant, Federalist Tom Paine. He early established himself as a leader among the Colbertistes of France, spread republican conceptions in Italy, and through his friends spread his direct influence into many parts of Germany. All of the greatest names in science of that period were directly or indirectly associated with Franklin and his humanist networks.
The fat, half-insane Mr. Guelph, heir of the faction that caused the bubonic plague, the Thirty years War, and every other massive evil that Europe had known since the thirteenth century, through Pitt, Bentham, the Barings, and other scoundrels, succeeded in decapitating and routing the humanist industrial-capitalist movement which the then-deceased Franklin had been central in organizing. Civilization itself was sent reeling backwards into the nightmare that was the Holy Alliance.
Hence, Karl Marx, born in 1818, remained all of his life ignorant of those great events which had come to such a denouement within two decades before his birth.
But, evil did not prevail entirely. The Bach who the British nominalist scoundrels had attempted to make a nonperson in history was not, in fact "accidentally" discovered by Mendelssohn in the famous 1824 performance. Bach was not unknown in Europe; that legend is a not-so-cheerful fraud. Among the humanists, Bach was a battle cry. Beethoven was steeped in Bach, as well as the humanist influences dominating Bonn during his childhood and youth. Mozart. who became familiar with Bach later in life - probably through humanist Illuminati circles - seized Bach fiercely. his music leaping ahead by giant steps in quality as a result.
Although the humanist movement was crushed by the events of 1792-1815, Beethoven's music lived, as did Mozart's. Despite the unsuccessful efforts of the bestialists to brush Beethoven and the late Mozart aside, especially Beethoven, with the "new beginning" undertaken by the clever, passionless Mendelssohn and the wretched, degenerate Wagner, these greatest humanist forces in musical culture, Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven, persisted, unquenchable wherever music was actually heard.
Despite the efforts of the British-based nominalists to stamp out the influence of what they denounced as "continental" scientific epistemology, Pasteur, Weierstrass, Riemann, and Cantor persisted through their work. Despite his wicked, induced prejudices. Faraday could not help but contribute to validating "continental" humanist scientific currents, even with the aid of Maxwell's conscious frauds toward that end. Despite the vile Kronecker, Cantor's work survives. It took the British more than.a century to stamp out French and German science, only to find the most advanced expression of these ~ e.g., Vernadsky - building a new "continental" scientific force in the Soviet Union. Despite the crimes of the Solvay conference and Niels Bohr's hideous, paid complicity in the events of the 1920s on behalf of one more effort to crush "continental science," that humanist current in science is now erupting in many parts of the world once again.
History is not unilinear as Hegel wished it to be, nor even as simple as Marx deceived himself to regard it. However, the power of evil is also not as all-powerful as British monetarists attempted to make it.
Thus, the victory of the nominalists over Europe during 1792-1815 and over the United States in 1828 could eradicate consciousness of his forebears from Marx's mind, but did not prevent the humanist influences implanted in his home city, Trier, from defining his world outlook and identity for all his life.
Unaware of the existence or content of the humanist capitalist struggles of the eighteenth and preceding centuries, deluded that English capitalism was the "natural" model for capitalist development, Neoplatonic humanist Karl Marx undertook to rescue the historically progressive humanist principles from the capitalist decay he recognized England to represent. If this is capitalism, then it is time for socialism. So, in the face of the manifest "parliamentary cretinism" of the German capitalist republicans, Marx resurrected Neoplatonic humanism in the form of scientific socialism.
Then history played a cruel joke upon the conniving nominalists.
Anglo-Dutch agent Alexander Helphand-Parvus, placed as a British intelligence agent of influence within the Kaiser's intelligence, conducted what was to have been a maJor operation for carving up the Austro-Hungarian and Czarist Empires to the mutual advantage of Germany. England, and Holland, operating for this purpose with the British-controlled pacifist (intelligence) movement operating along the Scandinavian "Northern Route." In the tangles and toils of Parvus' s schemings, he deemed his purpose to have Lenin, then exiled in brought to Russia to add to the confusion. Accordingly, the German. Dutch, and British networks delivered Lenin and his party to Russia, depositing the sum of three million Reichsmarks into Parvus sub-agent Karl Radek' s pocket to fund the festivities Parvus imagined would ensue.
Despite the insurance Parvus planted among the Bolsheviks in the persons of Karl Radek. N. Bukharin, Riazanov, and others, the Bolshevik revolution succeeded, and despite Bukharin's efforts, at the end of the 1920s belatedly launched its industrialization drive.
Now, Neoplatonic humanism has an armed bastion in the Warsaw Pact, a bastion too powerful to be eradicated. Soviet physics, best estimated to be two to four years in advance of the NATO countries in matters of momentous military potential, destroys for ever the possibility of the nominalists' continuing their efforts to impose "zero growth" and related policies in the NATO and similar countries.
The Warsaw Pact is not going to invade Western Europe - unless some idiot provokes World War III. The present condition of the socialist organizations within the capitalist countries precludes a socialist transformation from within those nations for the forseeable future - barring protracted economic collapse or war. Nonetheless, the industrialized capitalist nations are going to have to finally reconcile themselves to living with socialist nations that cannot be crushed, and thus to bend to the humanist aspirations of developing nations for technologically vectored industrial development of industry and agriculture. Basic scientific research and its humanist realization must now begin to leap ahead once again.
Thus, through the outgrowth of Karl Marx's work, the Soviet Union most notably, a global circumstance, has resulted in which, barring some insane idiot's provoking of general war, the entire world must adopt a Neoplatonic humanist policy. The advanced capitalist nations will continue to be capitalist nations, but they will be evolving rapidly into republics governed by Neoplatonic humanist principles.
In short, Karl Marx has turned out to be Benjamin Franklin' s revenge.
We must plan an appropriate celebration to this effect for the Trier Kasinogesellschaft.

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Page last modified on September 08, 2008, at 07:11 PM